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CORPORATE TAXATION AFTER THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986: A STATE OF
DISEQUILIBRIUM
ERIC M. ZOLTt
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue Act of l987funda-
mentally changed the taxation of corporations and their shareholders.
In this Article Professor Zolt contends that before the 1986 Act and the
1987 Act, certain biases contained in the individual and corporate tax
systems crudely offset each other such that a rough equilibrium governed
corporate taxation. Professor Zolt contends the fundamental changes
that Congress has imposed have upset that balance resulting in many
unexpected and perhaps undesirable consequences.
To demonstrate his thesis Professor Zolt surveys the major changes
in the two Acts. He then uses a series of quantitative examples to illus-
trate why those changes will have a "disequilibrating effect" on the cor-
porate tax system and may influence taxpayer decisions on form of
business operations, financing, and dividend policy. Professor Zolt con-
cludes his argument by calling on Congress to examine the effects of the
1986 Act and the 1987 Act, and to take some action to restore the bal-
ance that the taxation of corporations and their shareholders once
enjoyed.
The pressures to radically reduce individual tax rates and to maintain at
least nominal revenue neutrality from tax law changes have resulted in funda-
mental changes in the corporate tax system. The changes contained in the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (the "1986 Act")' and the Revenue Act of 1987 (the "1987
Act")2 upset a rough equilibrium for corporate taxation that prior tax laws had
created. These changes influence taxpayer decisions on form of business opera-
tions, financing, and dividend policy, and exacerbate the trend toward placing
the burden of the corporate tax primarily on publicly owned corporations. It is
unclear whether these consequences are desirable under any of the traditional
criteria for evaluating tax law changes. It is certain, however, that the 1986 and
1987 Acts fundamentally changed the corporate tax system. Apart from reve-
nue concerns, Congress did not give much consideration to these fundamental
changes and, as a result, many of their consequences were not intended.
t Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. B.S. 1974, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania; M.B.A. 1975, University of Chicago; J.D. 1978, University of Chicago. The author
thanks his colleagues at UCLA for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, especially
Michael R. Asimow, William A. Klein, Stephen R. Munzer, J. Mark Ramsayer, Jonathan D. Varat,
and Stephen C. Yeazell. The author would also like to thank David Anderson, Lynda Guild Simp-
son, and Roy F. Zerner for their comments, and Alan Epstein and Keith Marlowe for research
assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 141, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
2. Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 1001, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).
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This Article describes how the corporate tax system has been knocked off
balance, what changes in taxpayer behavior may result from the 1986 and 1987
Acts, and why the corporate tax will be borne increasingly by publicly held cor-
porations. Here is the itinerary. Section I examines the old equilibrium. It re-
views the biases created by having a separate, unintegrated corporate tax and the
compensating biases in the individual tax system. Section II examines the new
disequilibrium. It reviews the changes in the 1986 and 1987 Acts and describes
how these changes have upset the compensating biases. Section II then high-
lights the disequilibrating effects through a series of simple quantitative exam-
ples. These examples illustrate how the tax law changes could affect taxpayer
decisions on form of business operations, financing, and dividend policy. Section
III examines the alternatives available to Congress to restore some balance in the
taxation of corporations and their shareholders.
I. THE OLD EQUILIBRIUM-THE PRE-1986 AcT TAX REGIME
Under the pre-198 6 Act regime, a rough equilibrium governed the relation-
ship between the individual and corporate tax systems. That regime was not
without tax-induced distortions. A separate, unintegrated corporate tax system,
for example, creates a "double tax" on distributed corporate income.3 Further-
more, such a corporate tax system creates a bias against capital in corporate
form and biases in favor of debt financing and retained earnings. Other compo-
nents of the pre-1986 Act tax system, however-such as the ability to defer
shareholder-level tax until corporate earnings are distributed, lower corporate
tax rates as compared to individual tax rates, and the favorable rate preference
accorded capital gains-roughly compensated for the biases created by a sepa-
rate corporate tax system. Strong arguments support the position that the tax
system should not influence taxpayer decisions on form of business operations,
financing, and dividend policy. These decisions should be made on the basis of
economic factors apart from tax considerations. The compensating biases
greatly contributed to tax neutrality in these decisions.
The concept of compensating biases is important in understanding the rela-
tionship between the individual and corporate tax systems. Compensating biases
affect the coordination and relative importance of certain provisions of each sys-
tem, as well as the relative amounts of revenue to be raised by each system. 4
Compensating biases may also have a psychological effect on taxpayers. If tax-
payers determine the tax system to be in rough equilibrium with respect to the
tax benefits and detriments of certain activities, then they will be less willing to
change behavior solely for tax reasons.
This Section examines both the biases created by a separate corporate tax
3. Distributed corporate income bears a "double tax" because it is taxed at the corporate level
when earned and at the shareholder level when distributed.
4. For example, increasing the individual tax rate may increase corporate tax revenues if the
rate change results in more taxpayers adopting the corporate form or retaining more funds in the
corporation to avoid higher individual tax rates. Conversely, increasing corporate tax rates may
increase individual tax revenues if the rate change results in more taxpayers conducting their activi-
ties in noncorporate rather than corporate form.
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system and the compensating biases contained in the individual income tax sys-
tem.5 It then briefly reviews strategies taxpayers developed to minimize aggre-
gate shareholder and corporate tax liabilities under the pre-1986 Act tax regime.
A. Biases Resulting From a Separate Corporate Tax
1. Bias Against Capital in Corporate Form
The two-tier tax system results in a higher effective tax burden on capital
held in corporate form than that imposed on noncorporate investment. Only
corporations, 6 as opposed to proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations, 7
are subject to an entity-level tax. The additional tax burden may induce some
behavioral changes. Some economists contend that the corporate tax reduces
investment in general8 and investment in the corporate sector in particular.9
This analysis depends on certain assumptions regarding certainty,10 the struc-
ture of the tax system,'1 and incidence of the corporate tax. Although it is plau-
sible to assume changes in behavior, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
5. The discussion in the text is a summary of aggregate effects. However, the separate corpo-
rate tax may affect the allocation of investment among different assets, industries, and sectors, as
well as the aggregate level of investment. The tax may also have differing effects on industries that
traditionally have different debt levels or different dividend payout levels.
6. Certain trusts and partnerships may be taxed as corporations if they have more corporate
than noncorporate characteristics. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as revised in 1983); id,
§ 301.7701-3(b) (1967).
7. For a description of S corporations and qualification requirements see infta note 48. Unless
otherwise indicated, references to "corporations" signify corporations not electing to be taxed as S
corporations.
8. See Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86 J. POL. ECON. 29 (1978).
9. See Fullerton, Shoven & Whalley, General Equilibrium Analysis of U.S. Taxation Policy, in
1978 COMPENDIUM OF TAX RESEARCH 23 (U.S. Treas. Dept. Office of Tax Analysis 1978);
Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962). But see
Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PuB. EcoN. 303, 303 (1976) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Corporation
Tax] (contending that under certain assumptions the corporate tax is nondistortionary and does not
affect the financial structure or investment strategy of the corporation); Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate
Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 33 (1973) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Taxation]
(rejecting Harberger's conclusion that the corporate tax results in an inefficient allocation of re-
sources).
The bias is against new investment in corporate form, not against existing investment. The
value of existing investment already reflects the economic cost of the two-tier tax system. Changing
the tax system results in a windfall gain to current holders, but does not correct past inequities. For
a discussion of how the corporate tax affects stock valuation, see Warren, The Relation and Integra-
tion of Individual and Corporate Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REv. 719, 726-29 (1981), see also Bradford,
The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on Corporate Distributions, 15 J. PUB. EcON. 1, 21
(1981) (concluding that proposals to integrate the individual and corporate tax systems may result in
windfall gains to existing shareholders and may not make the tax system more efficient).
10. For an analysis of the effects of uncertainty in models measuring distortions caused by the
corporate tax, see Gordon, Uncertainty and the Analysis of Corporate Tax Distortions, 74 NAT'L TAX
ASS'N-TAX INST. OF AM. 31 (1981).
11. The models measuring distortion contain simplifying assumptions with respect to the oper-
ation of the tax system that do not fully reflect taxpayer strategies to minimize taxes. For a review of
these strategies, see infra notes 46-77 and accompanying text. Other economists find the corporate
tax to be nondistortionary when factors such as depreciation and interest deductibility are included
in the analysis. See, e.g., Flemming, A Reappraisal of the Corporation Income Tax, 6 J. PuB. ECON.
163, 169 (1976); King, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital, 4 J. PuB.
ECON. 271, 278 (1975).
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the degree of those changes. Behavioral effects are part of the larger question of
incidence.
The debate over the incidence of the corporate tax is long-standing and has
been thoroughly examined in the legal and economic literature. 12 Whether the
corporate tax can be shifted depends on the degree of competition in the particu-
lar market and the nature of the long-run adjustment mechanisms in the econ-
omy. 13 The empirical results are conflicting and the question likely will never be
satisfactorily resolved.14 Some economists contend that if shareholders bear the
tax, the additional tax causes inefficiency because it will cause shifts in resource
allocation away from the corporate sector. Based on this assumption, the sepa-
rate corporate tax results in a bias against investment in the corporate form.15
2. Bias in Favor of Debt Financing
Corporations have three basic alternatives in generating funds for new
projects: issuing new equity, issuing debt, or using retained earnings. In the
absence of taxes, and assuming certain other conditions, 16 a corporation's capi-
tal structure does not affect its value.17 This argument is based on the ability of
a shareholder to substitute personal for corporate leverage, thereby undoing at
the shareholder level any financing strategy adopted at the corporate level.' 8
12. For a summary of the competing theories of the incidence of the corporate tax, see R.
GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 44-72 (1951); Griffith, Integration of the Corporate and
Personal Income Taxes and the ALI Proposals, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 715, 724-31 (1983); see
also McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element In
Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REv. 532, 657 (1975) (arguing that to the extent corpo-
rations shift the corporate tax burden to consumers and labor via price and wage adjustments, and
assuming integration of the tax system would encourage corporations to reverse this shift, the case
for integration on equitable grounds is strengthened).
13. Stiglitz, Corporation Tax, supra note 9, at 309.
14. See Thurow, The Economics of Public Finance, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 185, 187 (1975); see also
Klein, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer's View of a Problem in Economics,
1965 WIs. L. REV. 576 (reviewing the shortcomings of various empirical studies of the incidence of
the corporate tax and finding the results to be wholly inconclusive).
15. Eliminating the corporate tax, however, may not result in a more ideal allocation of re-
sources. Because the United States economy deviates significantly from the perfectly competitive,
entirely unregulated economic model, removing the biases resulting from a separate corporate tax
will not necessarily result in a movement towards an ideal allocation of resources. See Lipsey &
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
16. The primary assumption is the existence of perfect capital markets-that is, markets in
which information is available at no cost to all investors, there are no transaction costs or taxes, and
investors are rational. An important characteristic of perfect capital markets is that all firms and
individuals can borrow or lend on the same terms. Other assumptions focus on a firm's expected
future operating earnings and the separation of firms into different risk and return classes.
17. The classic article finding the value of the corporation to be independent of its capital struc-
ture is Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,
48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). For a discussion of the assumptions underlying the Modigliani and
Miller position and subsequent commentary, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE
FINANCE 372-73, 379-402 (3d ed. 1987), and Gordon & Malkiel, Corporate Finance, in How TAXES
AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 131 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981), and the sources cited
therein. But see Jensen, Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM.
EcoN. REV. 323, 325 (1986) (finding that the empirical evidence seems to support the view that most
leverage-increasing transactions result in significantly positive increases in common stock prices).
18. A shareholder's ability to effectively change any capital structure adopted by a firm elimi-
nates any value that capital structure changes may have to a firm. Firms that are identical in every
way except their capital structures should therefore have the same value.
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The introduction of taxes, particularly the interest deduction provided in the
corporate tax system, 19 complicates the analysis. Using debt allows the corpo-
rate-level tax to be avoided, as interest deductions eliminate part, or in some
instances all, of the corporation's taxable income.20 In contrast, dividends are
not deductible. Therefore, all other things being equal, the corporation's value
increases when debt is substituted for equity in its capital structure.2 1
Several factors may work against the unlimited debt hypothesis. 22 Higher
debt levels increase the risk of bankruptcy. As the potential for bankruptcy in-
creases, greater uncertainty arises about the availability of future cash and tax
benefits. At some point, therefore, the additional risks of bankruptcy outweigh
the additional tax benefits from increased debt. Increased costs associated with
greater debt also further limit debt in the capital structure.23 Creditors may
demand more restrictive covenants and monitoring measures as the proportion
of debt in the capital structure increases. Conflicts may arise between bondhold-
ers and shareholders that may impair a corporation's performance and invest-
ment decisions. 24 Finally, the corporate tax benefits accorded debt financing
may be tempered by the tax benefits provided for equity financing in the individ-
ual tax system.2 5 As examined in the following sections, 26 interest income effec-
tively escapes corporate taxation but is heavily taxed at the debt holder level. In
contrast, equity income is subject to a corporate-level tax but receives favorable
tax treatment at the shareholder level.
3. Bias in Favor of Retained Earnings
If one assumes perfect capital markets, the corporation's decision whether
to retain or distribute earnings should not affect the value of the corporation.27
The shareholders can effectively undo any payout strategy adopted by the corpo-
19. See I.R.C. § 163 (1982).
20. In those cases in which the return from investment equals the cost of borrowing, the corpo-
rate-level tax is completely avoided. See also Cordes & Sheffrin, The Tax Advantage of Debt Fi-
nance, 74 NAT'L TAX Ass'N-TAx INST. OF AM. 44 (1981) (examining the value of debt deductions
in light of such competing tax shields as depreciation deductions and net operating losses).
21. The value of the corporation should increase in a linear fashion by the present value of the
tax savings from using debt. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 383-85.
22. No theory appears able to completely explain how firms choose their debt-equity ratio. See
generally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 377-403 (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing factors influencing the capital structure decision); Myers, The Captial Structure Puzzle,
39 J. FIN. 575 (1984) (advocating the "pecking order framework" for analyzing capital structure, in
which a firm prefers internal to external financing and debt to equity if it issues securities).
23. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 391-93. The increased costs are borne
by the shareholders in the form of higher interest payments or reduced operating flexibility. See also
Gordon & Malkiel, supra note 17, at 163-72 (estimating efficiency costs resulting from high debt-
equity ratios).
24. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 22, at 390-400.
25. See Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 268-72 (1977).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 34-38, 129-40.
27. See Black & Scholes, The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock
Prices and Returns, 1 J. FIN. ECoN. 1, 21 (1974) (concluding dividend policy is irrelevant to a firm's
value even in the presence of taxes); Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and Valuation of
Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411 (1961) (discussing the independence of dividend policy from the value of the
corporation).
1988]
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ration by either selling or buying additional stock. The introduction of taxes,
however, creates a bias against dividend distributions. The two-tier tax system
affects a corporation's dividend policy because distributed earnings are generally
subject to a "double tax": at the corporate level, when the income is earned, and
at the shareholder level, when the income is distributed. 28 The effect of the
double tax may be reduced by retaining earnings and thereby deferring imposi-
tion of the shareholder-level tax.
Tax incentives to accumulate funds at the corporate level may result in a
less efficient use of capital than would be the case if the funds were distributed to
shareholders.29 The two-tier tax system encourages corporate managers to act
as investment bankers for their shareholders because of the high tax costs of
distributing excess funds as dividends.30 Taxes also influence the form of corpo-
rate distributions. The tax system before the 1986 Act created a bias against
dividend distributions in favor of nondividend distributions. Dividend distribu-
tions were generally taxable to shareholders at ordinary income rates (before the
1986 Act, at rates of up to 50%), while nondividend distributions were generally
taxable at capital gain rates (before the 1986 Act, at rates of up to 20%).
Given the strong tax bias against dividends, one could surmise that corpo-
rations would refrain from making dividend distributions. Publicly held corpo-
rations, however, regularly distribute a significant proportion of their income as
dividends. 3 1 Three explanations have been offered. 32 First, there are enough
investors who either prefer dividends or are indifferent to the tax treatment of
dividends that the market may value dividends and capital gains equally. 33 Sec-
ond, despite the tax disadvantages of dividend distributions, shareholders may
prefer a steady stream of available income to the transaction costs that would
result from selling a portion of their holdings. Third, the payment of dividends
may positively influence the market's valuation of the corporation's stock to
such an extent that the improvement in investors' valuation of the corporation
outweighs the higher tax costs.
28. For an illustration of tax burdens before and after the 1986 Act, see infra notes 105-07 and
accompanying text. For a comparison of tax consequences of different dividend strategies before and
after the 1986 Act, see infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
29. See C. MCLURE, JR., MusT CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWIcE? 25 (1979); M.
NORR, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 56-57 (1982).
30. Managerial discretion over excess funds may explain the less-than-enthusiastic support
many members of the business community give integration. See ifra note 174.
31. Closely held corporations generally have been successful in paying out corporate earnings
without making dividend distributions. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
32. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 492-502 (and sources cited therein);
Gordon & Malkiel, supra note 17, at 174-76.
33. Corporate investors, for example, prefer dividends to capital gains because the dividends
received deduction allows corporations to deduct from their income either 70%, 80%, or 100% of
dividends received from domestic corporations, depending on the size of the ownership interest the
recipient corporation has in the payor corporation. I.R.C. § 243 (Supp. IV 1986). Tax-exempt in-
vestors are indifferent to the tax characterization of distributions as dividends or capital gains. For
any given financial policy adopted by a firm, there are likely to be investors who prefer that policy.
This phenomenon is known as the "clientele effect." See generally Auerbach, Stockholder Tax Rates
and Firm Attributes, 21 J. PuB. ECON. 107 (1983) (examining empirical results for the period 1963-




The biases created by the corporate tax system against capital in corporate
form and in favor of debt financing and retained earnings constitute only part of
the analysis. A more complete analysis must also consider the compensating
biases contained in the individual income tax system.34 Before the 1986 Act, the
individual tax system created a bias in favor of corporate investment through a
combination of three factors: the deferral of the shareholder-level tax until earn-
ings are actually distributed; a generally lower corporate (as compared to the
individual) tax rate on earnings retained; and the possibility of extracting funds
from the corporation at either capital gain rates or at no shareholder-level tax
cost if the shares are held until death.35 The result was that, when considered
together, the biases created by the corporate tax system and the biases created by
the individual tax system offset each other, albeit in a crude and incomplete
fashion.
It can be demonstrated that certain specific biases, under realistic assump-
tions, offset each other. Because of these compensating effects, the tax system
achieves rough equivalence between retained earnings and dividend distribu-
tions, and between debt financing and financing by retained earnings. For exam-
ple, a comparison of the tax benefits and costs of retaining or distributing
corporate earnings indicates rough equality.36 The major tax benefit of retaining
earnings results from the ability to defer the shareholder-level tax until the earn-
34. This position is sometimes referred to as the "new view" of corporate tax. This phrase was
used by Professor Auerbach in his article Tax Integration and the "New View" of the Corporate Tax:
A 1980's Perspective, 74 NAT'L TAX ASS'N-TAx INST. OF AM. 21 (1981); see B. BITTKER & J.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1.02 to .03
(5th ed. 1987); W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 287-95 (2d ed.
1986); Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity Capital and Debt, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1057 (1984);
Bradford, supra note 9; Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1039, 1051-55
(1987).
35. Historically, the high bracket individual taxpayer used the corporate entity as a tax shelter.
The use of the corporate form was especially attractive when the maximum individual tax rate
greatly exceeded the maximum corporate tax rate and when the tax rate applicable to ordinary
income greatly exceeded the tax rate applicable to capital gains.
Section 1014(a) provides that property acquired from a decedent has a basis of fair market value
at the date of death (or six months thereafter if the alternative valuation date is elected under
§ 2032). I.R.C. § 10 14(a) (1982). Therefore, neither the transferee nor the decedent recognizes gain
on any predeath appreciation.
36. See Reporter's Study on Corporate Distributions, Appendix to AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISI-
TIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (1982) [hereinafter A.L.I., REPORTER'S STUDY]. Professor William
Andrews illustrates this offsetting relationship with the following example. He assumes one dollar of
corporate funds is available for either reinvestment in the corporation (retained earnings) or distribu-
tion to shareholders (dividend distribution). If the dollar is reinvested in the corporation, produces a
return of 18% before tax, and the earnings are subject to a 50% corporate tax (or a 9% after-tax rate
of return), the dollar investment triples in about 13 years. This leaves $3 available for distribution to
shareholders, which if distributed and subject to a 50% shareholder-level tax, leaves the shareholder
with $1.50 after tax.
Alternatively, the dollar could immediately be distributed as a dividend to the shareholders.
Assuming again a 50% shareholder-level tax, this leaves only $50 to invest. In 13 years, again
assuming a 9% after-tax rate of return, this produces about $1.50, which is the same after-tax result
as in the retained earnings alternative above. See id. at 349-52. This equivalence depends on critical
assumptions: (i) corporate and individual investment opportunities are the same; (ii) corporate and
individual tax rates are equal; and (iii) the rate of tax on eventual distribution to shareholders is
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ings are distributed. The major tax cost is the imposition of a corporate-level tax
on subsequent earnings-a tax that could be avoided by initially distributing the
funds to shareholders.
Similarly, the tax system achieves rough neutrality between the tax conse-
quences of debt and retained earnings financing. 37 The major tax benefit of debt
financing-the use of interest deductions to reduce corporate-level tax liability-
equals the tax cost of choosing to distribute rather than reinvest retained earn-
ings; that is, the immediate shareholder-level tax on distributed funds. There
remain, however, several uncompensated biases, most notably those that work
against new corporate investment in favor of noncorporate investment, and
against dividend distributions in favor of nondividend distributions. 38
The existence of these uncompensated biases, and to a lesser extent the
compensated biases, provokes two quite different responses by tax theorists.
One response, championed primarily by academics, would eliminate or reduce
biases through integration of the individual and corporate tax systems.39 There
are two basic types of integration proposals: full integration and partial integra-
equal to the rate of tax on current distributions. A discussion of this relationship is also set forth in
Warren, The Timing of Taxes, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 499, 501 (1986).
Failure to satisfy the conditions would probably increase the bias in favor of earnings retention.
At least before the 1986 Act, the combination of (i) availability of capital gain rates on eventual
distribution, (ii) a lower corporate rate than shareholder rate, and (iii) the ability to use the corpora-
tion to make portfolio investments in corporate stock (thus taking advantage of the dividends re-
ceived deduction), created incentives to retain funds in corporate form. A.L.I., REPoRTER'S STUDY,
supra, at 350-51.
37. Professor Andrews examines the equivalence of debt financing and financing with retained
earnings with the following example. He assumes a corporation has $30,000 in retained earnings
and is about to undertake a $30,000 investment expected to yield 10%. One alternative is for the
corporation to distribute currently the $30,000 and to borrow from its shareholders (or from others)
at an interest rate of 10%. The corporate-level tax is eliminated, as interest deductions equal the
income from the investment. Assuming the shareholders are in a 46% bracket, distributing the
$30,000 to them produces $16,200 after tax.
Alternatively, the corporation could use accumulated earnings to pay for the investment, in
which case there would be no interest deduction. A 10% return on the project yields about $1,620
after tax (assuming a 46% corporate tax rate), or a 5.4% after-tax rate of return. The after-corpo-
rate-tax yield of $1,620 is equal to a 10% yield on $16,200. Again, the bias in favor of debt financing
(the use of the interest deduction to eliminate the corporate-level tax) and the bias in favor of re-
tained earnings (the value of deferral of the shareholder-level tax that would have resulted if funds
had been currently distributed rather than reinvested) are equal. If the shareholder's tax rate is
higher than the corporate rate, then financing by accumulated earnings would be preferred to debt
financing. If the shareholder rate is less than the corporate rate, then debt financing would be pre-
ferred. A.L.I., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 36, at 351-52.
The conclusion of equivalence ignores the effects of a capital gain tax imposed on a selling
shareholder for stock appreciation attributable to retained corporate profits. Although the selling
shareholder is taxed on this appreciation, the related retained earnings are still subject to corporate-
level tax. See Bryan, supra note 34, at 1053-54 n.63.
38. Uncompensated biases exist in three areas: (i) bias against new equity contributions; (ii)
bias in favor of nondividend distributions over dividend distributions; and (iii) bias in favor of corpo-
rate investment in other corporations over funds distribution. A.L.I., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra
note 36, at 353-55. For an analysis of the bias in favor of nondividend distributions, see Bryan, supra
note 34 (maintaining that this bias creates the primary tax incentive for leveraged buyouts).
39. Integration refers to the reciprocal relationship between the individual and corporate tax
systems and to the variety of techniques that, while different in form, have the common aim of
eliminating or reducing the "extra" tax burden of the corporate income tax on distributed profits.
M. NORR, supra note 29, at 41.
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tion.4° Full integration proposals offer as a basic premise the taxation of share-
holders on their pro rata share of corporate profits, whether or not the profits are
distributed. 4 1 Income under these proposals would be taxed solely at the share-
holder level.
The partial integration proposals focus on removing the double tax on dis-
tributed earnings while separately taxing retained earnings.42 To the extent the
shareholder tax rate exceeds the corporate tax rate, partial integration does not
fully correct for the tax benefit of deferring the shareholder tax until earnings are
distributed. Several different approaches to partial integration have been pro-
posed. Some approaches provide relief at the corporate level by allowing the
corporation a deduction for all or a portion of dividends paid.43 Other ap-
proaches provide relief at the shareholder level in the form of either a dividends
40. See C. McLURE, JR., supra note 29, at 227-30 (describing 1977 Treasury Department Pro-
posal); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT ON TAX POLICY AND CAPITAL FORMA-
TION (1977) [hereinafter STAFF 1977 REPORT]; U.S. TREAS. DEPT., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX
REFORM 68-75 (1977) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]; McLure, supra note 12; Peel, A Proposal for Elimi-
nating Double Taxation of Corporate Dividends, 39 TAX LAW. 1 (1985); Warren, supra note 9.
The integration proposals discussed herein are not the sole approach to eliminating the biases
created by the two-tier tax system. See, eg., Shoven & Taubman, Saving, Capital Income and Taxa-
tion, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 203 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980); King, The Cash
Flow Corporate Income Tax, NBER Working Paper No. 1993 (1986) (presenting alternative ap-
proaches for eliminating the biases).
41. This approach was endorsed in BLUEPRINTS, supra note 40, at 68-75. Four rules form the
basis of BLUEPRINTS' tax treatment of corporate profits: (i) each holder of stock on the first day of
the corporation's accounting year would be designated the shareholder of record; (ii) each share-
holder of record would add (subtract) to his tax base his share of the corporation's income (loss)
annually; (iii) the basis of the shareholder of record in his stock would be increased (decreased) by
the shareholder's share of income (loss); and (iv) any shareholder's basis in his stock would be re-
duced, but not below zero, by cash dividends or fair market value of any properly distributed to him.
Once the shareholder's basis is reduced to zero, the value of any further distributions would be
included in income. Id. at 69-70.
Reservations about the conduit approach have centered on liquidity problems for shareholders
where no corporate distributions are made, administrative problems in identifying shareholders and
transferring shares, allocating income for different types of securities, audit adjustments, and the
fairness of taxing income not distributed. See R. GOODE, supra note 12, at 184-90; C. McLURE, JR.
supra note 29, at 146-84; Warren, supra note 9, at 740.
42. See M. NORR, supra note 29, at 83-149; Comm. on Corps. of the Tax Section of the N.Y.
Bar Assoc., Report on Integration of Corporate and Individual Taxes, 31 TAX LAw. 37 (1977) [here-
inafter New York Bar Association Integration Report]; McLure, supra note 12, at 550-56.
43. Some proposals limit the amount of the deduction allowing relief only for "normal" distri-
butions-dividends that reflect the cost of equity capital. Limitations may also be tied to a rate of
interest, a proportion of dividends paid, or an imputed cost of equity capital. See M. NORR, supra
note 29, at 100-06. Professor Andrews has proposed allowing a deduction for any dividend paid, but
only up to the amount of a reasonable interest rate (the prevailing yield on high-grade corporate
bonds) applied to the amount of equity contributed after the proposal becomes effective. See A.L.I.,
REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 36, at 366-70.
The Treasury's November 1984 report proposed allowing corporations to deduct 50% of divi-
dends paid subject to a source limitation. 2 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ch. 7.01 (1984)
[hereinafter TREASURY NOVEMBER 1984 REPORT]. The President's May 1985 proposal modified
the Treasury Department approach by limiting the deduction to 10% of dividends paid. PRESI-
DENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY § 6.02
(1985) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S MAY 1985 PROPOSALS]. Similarly, H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 311 (1985) provided for domestic corporations a deduction for 10% of dividends paid out of earn-
ings taxed after the effective date of the provision. A description of this proposal is set forth in
Simon, Comments on Dividends Paid Deduction of H.R. 3838, 31 TAX NOTES 609 (1986).
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received credit 44 or an exclusion. 45
Another response to the biases created by the separate, unintegrated corpo-
rate tax is to avoid addressing the problem directly and instead to hope that the
compensating biases act to keep things balanced. In the past, Congress was able
to follow this approach because the compensating biases resulted in rough tax
neutrality for taxpayer decisions on form of business operations, financing, and
dividend policy. After the 1986 Act, Congress may no longer have that luxury.
C. Taxpayer Strategies for Minimizing Taxes Under the
Pre-1986 Act Tax Regime
Before the 1986 Act, taxpayers used three strategies 46 to cope with the two-
tier tax system and to mitigate the tax penalty of operating in the corporate
form: avoiding the corporate-level tax; deferring payment of tax, whether at the
shareholder or corporate level; and extracting corporate earnings at capital gain
rates.47 These strategies made operating in the corporate form palatable and, at
times, even preferable. In order to determine the effect of the 1986 and 1987
Acts on taxpayer behavior, this Section reviews taxpayer strategies that devel-
oped in the pre-1986 Act tax regime. Section II then examines how changes in
the 1986 and 1987 Acts alter these strategies.
1. Avoiding the Corporate-Level Tax
In the pre-1986 Act tax regime, the corporate-level tax could be reduced or
eliminated in several ways. First, and most obviously, the corporate-level tax
could be avoided by operating in noncorporate form or as an S corporation. 48
44. See C. McLURE, JR., supra note 29, at 51-55 (analysis of shareholder credit systems in
France and Great Britain). Two versions of a dividends received credit plan were proposed in 1978
by Rep. Al Ullman, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. The Ullman plans pro-
vided for a refundable shareholder credit for a portion of dividends received, with shareholders
grossing-up their dividends by the amount of the corporate tax attributable to the distribution. 124
CONG. REC. 2,132-34, 7,978-80 (1978); see also Warren, supra note 9, at 794-98 (presenting quantita-
tive examples of the effect of the Ullman proposal on shareholders in different tax brackets).
45. For a detailed proposal for excluding dividends from a shareholders' gross income, see Peel,
supra note 40.
46. A possible fourth strategy of minimizing tax is avoiding shareholder-level tax. Two exam-
ples of this strategy are using the stepped-up basis provisions of § 1014 to avoid tax on predeath
appreciation, see supra note 35, and relying on Code provisions that allow an employee to exclude
certain fringe benefits from gross income, see infra note 49.
47. The strategies have emerged within the framework of the pre-1986 Act individual and cor-
porate tax systems. See Clark, Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1978) (describing the basic principles or decisions the author contends
comprise this framework). A similar approach to examining the basic premises of the corporate tax
system is included in Faber, Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders: Premises of the Present
System, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 5 (1985).
48. This type of corporation, which has its roots in the small business relief legislation of tile
mid-1950s, is treated for tax purposes in a manner similar to partnerships. See Starr, The S Corpora-
tion: Is it the Right Choice?, 43 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 5-1 (1985); Yelen, Choosing the S
Corporation as the Preferred Entity, 42 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 13-1 (1984). Requirements for S
corporation treatment include: (i) that the corporation be a domestic corporation with only one
class of stock; (ii) that the corporation have no more than 35 shareholders; (iii) that the shareholders
be individuals, except for certain estates and qualifying trusts, and that no shareholders can be non-
resident aliens; and (iv) that the corporation not be a member of an affiliated group or an otherwise
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Second, entities that are taxed as regular corporations can reduce or eliminate
the corporate-level tax by increasing expenses, in either legitimate or not-so-
legitimate ways. Closely held corporations historically have been effective in
reducing or eliminating the corporate-level tax, primarily by increasing compen-
sation paid to shareholder-employees. 49 Another strategy for avoiding the cor-
porate-level tax involves shareholders disguising equity contributions as debt to
convert nondeductible dividend distributions into deductible interest
payments.50
More legitimate methods of reducing or eliminating the corporate-level tax
rely on the use of depreciation deductions, investment tax credits, interest de-
ductions, net operating losses, and industry-specific preferences. The revision of
depreciation allowances in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 significantly
reduced or eliminated tax liability for many corporations. 51 The recent spate of
leveraged buyouts substituted debt for equity in capital structures and thus re-
duced or eliminated tax liability for many corporations that previously had rela-
tively high marginal tax rates.5 2 Furthermore, net operating losses, either self-
generated or acquired, reduced or eliminated corporate-level tax. A profitable
corporation could acquire or combine with a loss corporation to shelter the com-
bined corporation's future income with the loss corporation's past losses.53
"ineligible corporation" within the scope of § 1361(b). I.R.C. § 1361 (Supp. IV 1986); see J. EusTIcE
& J. KuNTz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS %% 7, 9 (rev. ed. 1985).
49. Items most favored by taxpayers, especially shareholder-employee taxpayers, are those that
are deductible by the corporation but not included in income by the employee. See B. BrrKER,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs II 12-14 (1981). Examples include
such fringe benefits as a limited amount of the cost of group term life insurance, I.R.C. § 79 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), the cost of qualified prepaid legal service plans, I.R.C. § 120 (1982 & Supp. III
1985), education assistance programs, I.R.C. § 127 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), certain fringe benefits,
I.R.C. § 132 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and meals and lodging furnished to employees for the conven-
ience of the employer, I.R.C. § 119 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Only slightly less desirable are pay-
ments made to qualified pension plans. The corporation receives an immediate deduction for
contributions made; the employee recognizes the income only when the funds are distributed, and
then often at favorable tax rates.
50. See B. BrrTKER & J. EusTiCE, supra note 34, 1 4.01-.04; Plumb, The Federal Income Tax
Significance of Corporate Debt. A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REv. 369 (1971)
(overview of debt-equity issue). Related strategies for disguising dividend distributions include bar-
gain sales from the corporation to shareholders, excess rental or royalty payments made by the
corporation for the use of shareholder property, and shareholder use of corporate entertainment
facilities. See generally Comment, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey, 3 UCLA L. REv.
207 (1956) (reviewing various types of transactions through which a shareholder might receive cor-
porate earnings without payment of a corporate-level tax).
51. See I.R.C. § 168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For an examination of the effects of Accelerated
Cost Recovery System (ACRS) depreciation, investment tax credits, and industry-specific tax prefer-
ences on reducing or eliminating corporate tax liability of 275 large publicly held corporations, see
Citizens for Tax Justice, Corporate Taxpayers and Corporate Freeloaders, 29 TAX NOTES 947 (1985).
For a discussion of the effect of ACRS on corporate income and integration proposals, see Warren,
Corporate Integration Proposals and ACRS, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325 (1985).
52. See Canellos, The Over-Leveraged Acquisition, 39 TAX LAW. 91 (1935).
53. The 1986 and 1987 Acts impose new limitations on the use and value of net operating losses
obtained in acquisitions and combinations involving loss corporations. See Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 621, 100 Stat. 2085, 2254 (1986) (amending I.R.C. §§ 382-83); Revenue Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 10,225-26, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-413 to -416 (1987) (amending I.R.C.
§ 382 and adding I.R.C. § 384); Wootton, Section 382 After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 64 TAXES
874 (1986).
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Finally, the General Utilities doctrine54 provided an opportunity to avoid
recognizing corporate-level gain on certain distributions of appreciated property.
Corporate income from the disposition of appreciated property is generally
taxed at both the corporate level when the disposition takes place and at the
shareholder level when the proceeds are distributed. The General Utilities doc-
trine, however, allowed corporations to avoid tax either by distributing appreci-
ated property to shareholders as a dividend in certain limited instances or by
making certain liquidating sales or distributions. 5 The doctrine thus allowed
shareholders to extract appreciated property, or the proceeds of the sale of such
property, from the corporation at the cost of a single shareholder-level capital
gain tax.5 6
Reducing or eliminating corporate-level tax does not affect the structure of
the two-tier tax system. It does, however, reduce the aggregate tax cost of oper-
ating in corporate form, and it reduces the pressure for formally integrating the
individual and corporate tax systems.
2. Deferral Techniques
Taxpayers can mitigate the tax burden of operating in the corporate form
by using deferral techniques to postpone the recognition of income. Two such
techniques are the use of nonrecognition provisions and the use of the retained
54. The doctrine stems from the 1935 United States Supreme Court decision, General Utilities
& Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). That decision involved facts different from the
transactions usually within the scope of the doctrine. In General Utilities, a corporation distributed
highly appreciated stock in another corporation to its shareholders. The shareholders subsequently
sold the stock to a third party. The court held that a corporation did not realize income when it
declared an in-kind dividend and paid it with appreciated property. For a good review of the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine and its erosion before the 1986 Act, see Block, Liquidations Before and After
Repeal of General Utilities, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307 (1984).
55. Before the 1986 Act, I.R.C. §§ 336-38 (1982) generally allowed a corporation to avoid a
corporate-level tax (other than gain from certain specified items, principally depreciation recapture
and certain other items and the recovery of tax benefits): (i) on the in-kind distribution of appreci-
ated assets to shareholders in complete liquidation; (ii) on the sale of appreciated assets in connection
with a plan of complete liquidation; or (iii) upon the election by a corporation acquiring at least 80%
of a corporation's stock, via a step-up in the basis of the acquired corporation's assets.
In certain limited instances, I.R.C. "§ 31 l(d) (1982) provided relief from corporate-level tax on
dividend distributions of appreciated property to shareholders. The ability to achieve nonrecogni-
tion treatment on nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property was curtailed by the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 54, 98 Stat. 495, 568 (1984) (amending I.R.C.
§ 311(d)).
56. This strategy allowed the recipient of the property to receive a stepped-up basis in the assets
of the liquidating or acquired corporation. The higher basis would generate additional depreciation
or amortization deductions. Closely related to schemes for avoiding the corporate-level tax by trans-
ferring appreciated property in liquidation are attempts to avoid recognizing income at the corporate
level by transferring in "midstream" liquidation accounts receivable, claims for services rendered,
and other sources of future income. See B. BrrrKER & J. EuSTIcE, supra note 34, 111.62 and cases
cited therein; Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake
Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 293, 404-24 (1962) (examining the application of the assignment-of-income
doctrine to transfers in connection with complete liquidations). Corporations also have deducted or
expensed, under their accounting methods, items that in light of the liquidation distort income either
because such items are not fully consumed prior to liquidation or the income relating to such items




earnings strategy.5 7 The Code provides nonrecognition treatment at both the
shareholder and corporate levels.58 Shareholders can take advantage of nonrec-
ognition treatment in the formation of the corporation,59 certain transfers of
shares, 60 and certain changes in form of shareholder investment. 61 Corpora-
tions may qualify for nonrecognition treatment in various degrees upon incorpo-
ration, subsequent contributions in exchange for stock, 62 certain distributions, 63
reorganizations," S elections, 65 and liquidations.6 6
Corporations using the retained earnings strategy simply defer a share-
holder-level tax on corporate earnings by not paying dividends and by allowing
the earnings to accumulate until the corporation is liquidated. 67 In addition to
deferring the shareholder-level tax, the retained earnings strategy yielded two
other important benefits in the pre-1986 Act tax regime. First, the income on
57. In addition to the Code's nonrecognition provisions and retained earnings strategies, ac-
counting strategies play a large role in taxpayers' attempts to defer tax liability. Accounting strate-
gies have focused on choice of accounting method, selection of fiscal year, choice of inventory
method, and use of the installment sales method. The statutory provisions governing accounting
periods and methods are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 441-73 (1982, Supp. IV 1986).
58. The mechanics of nonrecognition treatment are generally that a transaction is not taxed
currently, and the basis of the old property carries over to the new property. See B. BITrKER, supra
note 49, 44 (discussing the mechanics of nonrecognition treatment and the effect of receiving non-
qualifying property). Of course, nonrecognition treatment may also work to a taxpayer's disadvan-
tage, either by precluding recognition of loss, or when the present value of tax benefits from a
stepped-up basis of the asset exceeds the tax cost of immediate recognition.
59. I.R.C. § 351 (1982) provides generally that no gain or loss shall be recognized on the contri-
bution of property to a corporation, provided that certain conditions are satisfied.
60. A shareholder may give stock without recognition of gain; the transferor takes a carryover
basis from the donor. See id. §§ 102, 1015 (1982, Supp. IV 1986). Shares of stock are not eligible,
however, for like-kind exchange treatment. Id. § 1031(a)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
61. Shareholders generally can use the Code's reorganization provisions to change the form of
their equity investment without gain recognition, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. See
id. §§ 354-68 (1982, Supp. IV 1986).
62. The corporation does not recognize gain or loss from the issuance of stock in exchange for
property. Id. §§ 118, 1032 (1982, Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1988).
63. Nonrecognition treatment for corporations for distributions with respect to their stock has
been narrowed considerably. See B. BrrrKER & J. EusncE, supra note 34, 7.20, 7.22.
64. I.R.C. § 361(a) (West Supp. 1988) provides generally that no gain or loss shall be recog-
nized if a corporation or party to a reorganization exchanges property solely for stock or securities in
another corporation or a party to a reorganization in pursuance of a plan of reorganization. Section
1032 also shields a corporation issuing its own stock in exchange for money or other property from
recognizing gain or loss. Id. § 1032 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
65. No tax results from electing S corporation status; however, for corporations making S elec-
tions after December 31, 1986, § 1374 provides for a tax on built-in gains accruing prior to the S
election for assets disposed of during the 10-year period following the S election. Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 632, 100 Stat. 2085, 2275 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 1374 (Supp. IV
1986)). Section 10227 of the 1987 Act requires a corporation that maintains its inventories under the
last-in, first-out (LIFO) method to include LIFO recapture amounts (the excess of the inventories'
value using first-in, first-out (FIFO) over its LIFO value as of the close of the corporation's last year
as a C corporation) in income, payable in four equal annual installments, on converting from C to S
corporation status. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10227, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-416
(1987) (amending I.R.C. § 1363).
66. I.R.C. §§ 336-37 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (amended 1986). See infra text accompanying
notes 92-94 for the effect of the 1986 Act changes on the taxation of liquidating corporations.
67. In an effort to prevent taxpayers from using the corporation to shelter accumulated earn-
ings from personal income taxes, Congress enacted an accumulated earnings tax, I.R.C. § 531 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986) and a tax on personal holding companies, I.R.C. § 541 (1982). Neither provision
has been particularly successful in preventing use of the retained earnings strategy.
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amounts retained was generally subject to the lower corporate tax rate,68 and
sometimes sheltered through the use of corporate tax preferences. Second, the
tax rate imposed on funds finally distributed could be substantially lower if the
transaction qualified for capital gain treatment or if the stock was held until the
death of the shareholder, -in which case predeath appreciation would escape
untaxed.
3. Bailout Techniques
In the pre-1986 Act tax regime, a large part of corporate tax planning fo-
cused on extracting funds out of corporations in transactions that qualified for
capital gain treatment.69 Before the 1986 Act, capital gains received favorable
treatment in three major respects. First, individuals and other noncorporate
taxpayers could deduct 60% of their net capital gain, resulting in only 40% of
the gain being included in their taxable income.70 Second, income from capital
assets was taxed only when the gain was realized. 71 Third, assets transferred
from a decedent received a stepped-up basis, which allowed predeath apprecia-
tion to escape untaxed. 72 The combination of these preferences resulted in a
very low effective tax rate on capital gains.73
Bailout transactions are of different types and complexities. The simplest
transaction, a sale of stock to an unrelated buyer, generates capital gain because
68. Historically, the maximum individual tax rate has exceeded the maximum corporate tax
rate. For example, from 1979 to 1981, the maximum individual rate exceeded the corporate rate by
24 percentage points. The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 reduced the spread to four points. For a
comparison of the top individual and corporate tax rates from 1934 through 1988, see J. EuSTIcE, J.
KUNTZ, C. LEWIS & T. DEERING, THE TAx REFORM ACT OF 1986: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY
1 2.02(l)(c), at 2-8 (1987).
69. See Lowe, Bailouts: Their Role in Corporate Planning, 30 TAX L. REv. 357 (1975).
70. The excluded portion of the capital gain constituted an item of tax preference which could
subject an individual to alternative minimum tax liability. I.R.C. §§ 55, 57(a)(9) (1982). This
slightly narrowed the gap between the tax rates on capital gain and ordinary income.
71. For a general discussion of realization of gains and losses, see B. BITrKER, supra note 49, 1
22. Realized gains are subject to tax absent qualification for nonrecognition treatment. See supra
notes 58-66 and accompanying text. Distortion inherent in the realization requirement applies to all
assets, not just capital assets. For a proposal to change the realization requirement for taxation, see
Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111
(1986). For an interesting proposal to eliminate the deferral preference for capital assets, see Brin-
ner, Inflation, Deferral and the Neutral Taxation of Capital Gains, 26 NAT'L TAX . 565 (1973).
72. This basis adjustment allows gain from all assets, including capital assets, accruing prior to
decedent's death to escape taxation. There have been several attempts to repeal this generous provi-
sion. One proposal treats the death of a taxpayer as a taxable event and requires constructive reali-
zation of gains at death. See Kurtz and Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury
Proposals, The Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1970). A different approach
does not tax the decedent on predeath appreciation but requires the transferee to take a carryover
basis in the inherited assets. This approach was adopted in 1976 but never became effective. Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1023, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872, repealed by Crude Oil Wind-
fall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229, 299. The cost of allowing
predeath appreciation to escape untaxed is estimated at almost $12.4 billion for fiscal year 1988,
U.S. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES Gov-
ERNMENT Table G-2 (fiscal 1988).
73. Examining Treasury Department statistics from 1926 through 1961, Bailey estimated the
effective tax rate on capital gains to be approximately 8 to 9%. Bailey, Capital Gains and Income




the Code makes no attempt to allocate to the selling shareholder her share of the
corporation's undistributed earnings and profits. 74 A shareholder receives simi-
lar tax treatment on the liquidation of the corporation.75 More complex are
transactions in which the corporation repurchases its own stock. Taxpayers, the
IRS, and the courts have struggled in attempting to distinguish between redemp-
tions that have the effect of a sale to an unrelated buyer and redemptions that
are disguised dividend transactions. 7 6 The determination whether to apply sale
or dividend treatment becomes more difficult when taxpayers combine the stock
redemption with other transactions.
77
4. Summary
Before the 1986 Act, well-established taxpayer strategies generally allowed
closely held entities to choose between subjecting their income to a corporate-
level tax and having the income taxed directly to their owners. The corporate-
level tax could be avoided directly-by operating in noncorporate form or elect-
ing S corporation status-or indirectly-by shifting income away from the cor-
poration through disguised dividends and other techniques. Taxpayers electing
to conduct activities in corporate form generally could minimize aggregate
shareholder and corporate tax liabilities by retaining funds in corporate form
until such time as the funds could be extracted in a transaction qualifying for
capital gain treatment. Although publicly held entities had less flexibility in
avoiding the corporate-level tax, they typically have succeeded in reducing or
eliminating that tax, primarily through the use of depreciation deductions, in-
vestment tax credits, interest deductions, net operating losses, and industry-spe-
cific tax preferences.
II. THE NEW DISEQUILIBRIUM-THE POST-1986 ACT TAX REGIME
Before the 1986 Act, a rough equilibrium governed the relationship be-
tween the individual and corporate tax systems. Things have changed. The
1986 Act changes destroyed the rough balance by upsetting the compensating
biases, and the 1987 Act changes have further aggravated the situation. This
Section first reviews the 1986 and 1987 Acts' changes. It then illustrates
74. The Code treats the sale of corporate stock solely as a shareholder-level event so the
amount of the corporation's undistributed earnings and profits is generally not relevant to the char-
acterization of the shareholder's gain.
75. Section 331(a) treats amounts received by a shareholder in a distribution in complete liqui-
dation as if received in full payment in exchange for the stock. I.R.C. § 331(a) (1982).
76. Section 302 attempts to provide greater certainty in determining the tax consequences of a
redemption by providing for exchange treatment if the transaction falls into any of the following
categories: (i) a redemption that is "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" under § 302(b)(1); (ii) a
"substantially disproportionate" redemption under § 302(b)(2); (ill) a complete termination of a
shareholder's interest under § 302(b)(3); and (iv) a redemption from a noncorporate shareholder in
partial liquidation under § 302(b)(4). Id. § 302(b); see B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 34, 1
9.04-. 10.
77. Examples of different combinations include: (i) the preferred stock bailout; (ii) the divisive
bailout; (iii) the security bailout; (iv) the liquidation-reincorporation bailout; and (v) the General
Utilities bailout. For a description of these transactions see Clark, supra note 47, at 95, 113, 120-23,
125-30, 132-35.
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through simple quantitative examples the effect of the 1986 Act changes on the
compensating biases in the tax system. The Section then highlights the disequili-
brating effects of these changes by examining how taxpayer strategies have been
altered by the 1986 and 1987 Acts' changes.
A. The 1986 and 1987 Acts' Changes and Their Impact
on the Compensating Biases
1. The 1986 Act Changes
In the 1986 Act, Congress made three major changes that have had perva-
sive impact on the compensating biases (collectively, the "1986 Act changes"):
Congress eliminated the rate preference for capital gains; it reduced the tax rates
for individuals and corporations and set the maximum corporate rate higher
than the maximum individual rate; and it repealed the General Utilities doc-
trine. 78 Strong arguments can be made for each of these changes. Reducing
rates, eliminating the favorable rate preference for capital gains, and repealing
the General Utilities doctrine all are likely to improve the tax system.79 As ap-
plied to the relationship between corporations and shareholders, however, these
changes, especially in the aggregate, may have highly undesirable consequences.
Each of these features of the pre-1986 Act tax system mitigated the "double tax"
on distributed corporate income.
The 1986 Act repealed section 1202, the 60% exclusion of net capital gains
for individuals. 80 The preferential tax rates for capital gains have been in the tax
78. In addition to the above changes, the 1986 Act also made operating in the corporate form
less attractive by (i) strengthening the corporate minimum tax; see infra note 91; (ii) imposing a tax
on corporations making S elections after December 31, 1986 for certain built-in gains during a 10-
year look-back period, I.R.C. § 1374 (Supp. IV 1986); (iii) limiting the use of net operating losses; see
supra note 53; and (iv) enacting a series of accounting changes making it more difficult for taxpayers,
including corporations, to defer taxes. The accounting changes include requiring use of uniform
capitalization rules, I.R.C. § 263A (Supp. IV 1986), imposition of interest charges on the use of
certain accounting methods for long-term contracts, I.R.C. § 460 (Supp. IV 1986), limitations on the
use of the installment sales method for revolving credit plans and publicly traded property, I.R.C.
§§ 453-453A (Supp. IV 1986), restrictions on the use of the cash method of accounting, with excep-
tions for farming businesses, qualified personal service corporations, and entities that satisfy a $5
million gross receipts test, I.R.C. § 448 (Supp. IV 1986), changes in the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System of depreciation, I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. IV 1986) and repeal of the investment tax credit, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat. 2085, 2166 (1986). For an excellent summary of these provisions, see J.
EuSTICE, L KuNrrz, C. LEwIs & T. DEERING, supra note 68, 6.01-.05.
79. The 1986 Act reduces tax-induced distortions by reducing the individual and corporate tax
rates and by narrowing the range of effective tax rates on various assets and industries. See generally
D. FULLERTON, Y. HENDERSON & J. MACKIE, INVESTMENT ALLOCATION AND GROWTH UNDER
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (U.S. Treas. Dept. Office of Tax Analysis Apr. 1987) (concluding
that although the 1986 Act might reduce overall investment and saving incentives, the tax changes
should improve allocation of capital among assets and industries). For an analysis of effective tax
rates by asset type and industry, see J. GRAVELLE, EFFECTIVE CORPORATE TAX RATES IN THE
MAJOR TAX REVISION PLANS: A COMPARISON OF THE HOUSE, SENATE, AND CONFERENCE COM-
MITrEE VERSIONS Table 2 (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 86-854E, Aug. 1986). For arguments supporting
the repeal of the rate preference for capital gains and the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, see
sources cited infra notes 80 & 93-94.
80. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100 Stat. 2085, 2216 (1986); For a review of the arguments for
and against preferential capital gain treatment, see R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 184-
221 (1964); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1131-35 (1974); Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247
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system since the Revenue Act of 1921.81 Although proposals to reform capital
gain treatment have surfaced regularly, the 1986 Act changes differ from past
proposals.8 2 After a transition period, capital gains are subject to tax at the
same rates as other income.83 Eliminating the rate preference dramatically de-
parts from past tax treatment,84 and can result in rate increases of between 40%
for high-bracket taxpayers, and over 200% for low-bracket taxpayers.8 5
The centerpiece of the 1986 Act is a reduction in individual tax rates. After
a transition period,8 6 the maximum individual marginal rate is 28%.87 A 5%
surcharge, however, exists for taxpayers within certain income ranges.88 Corpo-
rations also benefit from reduced tax rates.8 9 The 1986 Act reduces the top
(1957); Minarik, Capital Gains, in How TAxEs AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 241-77 (H. Aaron &
J. Pechman eds. 1981).
81. For a history of capital gain taxation, see Mayhall, Capital Gains Taxation-The First One
Hundred Years, 41 LA. L. REV. 81 (1980); Minarik, supra note 80, at 268-75.
82. Recent proposals were included in both the Treasury November 1984 Report and the Presi-
dent's May 1985 Proposals. Rather than merely repealing the rate preference, the Treasury Novem-
ber 1984 Report eliminated the classification of assets as either capital or noncapital assets. To
eliminate the taxation of noneconomic gains, the Treasury November 1984 Report provided for
assets (other than debt instruments and inventory) to be indexed for inflation so that only economic
gains would be subject to tax. The Treasury November 1984 Report retained the loss limitation
rules for investment property and retained the current nonrecognition and realization rules. TREAS-
URY NOVEMBER 1984 REPORT, supra note 43, ch. 9.01.
A different approach was taken six months later in the President's May 1985 Proposals. The
President's proposals reflected an overriding concern to retain the preferential treatment of capital
gains as an additional incentive for high-risk venturing. The proposals retained the preferential rates
for capital gains by allowing 50% of the net capital gain to be excluded from income and, beginning
in 1991, giving individual taxpayers an option to index the basis of capital assets for inflation in lieu
of the capital gain rate preference. PRESIDENT'S MAY 1985 PROPOSALs, supra note 43, § 7.04.
83. Although net capital gains are taxed nominally at 28%, the gains could move other income
into the 33% bracket. See Gardner & Stewart, Capital Gains and Losses After the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 65 TAxEs 125, 127 (1987).
84. It is also important to focus on the historical difference between rates for ordinary income
and long-term capital gains. In 1922, the spread was 43.5 points, as earned income was taxed at
56% and long-term capital gains were taxed at 12.5%. The spread increased following the 1938 Act;
ordinary income was taxed at a maximum 79% rate and capital gains were taxed at 15%. More
recently the spread has gone from 52 points in 1964, when ordinary income was taxed at a maximum
rate of 77% and capital gains were taxed at a maximum rate of 25%, to 33.5 points in 1972 with
ordinary income taxed at 70% and capital gains taxed at 36.5%, and then to 30 points beginning in
1982 with earned income taxed at 50% and capital gains taxed at 20%.
85. A comparison of pre-1986 Act rates and rates applicable in 1987 to capital gains is set forth
in Gardner & Stewart, supra note 83, at 125, 129. Including the effect of state taxes makes the
effective increase even greater. See Conda, Next Year's Tax Bill: Fix Capital Gains, 33 TAX NOTES
409 (1986).
86. The rate schedules for 1987 had five conventional tax brackets: 11, 15, 28, 35, and 38.5%.
I.R.C. § 1(h) (Supp. IV 1986).
87. For single taxpayers, income up to $17,850 is taxed at 15% with income over that amount
taxed at 28%. Id. § l(a). For married taxpayers filing jointly, income up to $29,750 is taxed at 15%
with income over that amount taxed at 28%. Id. § l(a).
88. A 5% surcharge is imposed on single taxpayers with income between $43,150 and $89,560
and married taxpayers with income between $71,900 and $149,250. Taxpayers thus bear an effective
maximum marginal tax rate of 33% for income within those ranges. The first 5% surtax phases out
the tax benefit from having part of the individual's income taxed at the 15% rate. The second 5%
surtax phases out the tax benefit gained from personal and dependency exemptions so that the ranges
are greater than the numbers in the text and depend on the number of exemptions claimed. See id.
§ l(g).
89. The five-tier rate structure was replaced with a three-tier rate structure effective for taxable
years beginning on or after July 1, 1987:
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marginal corporate rate from 46% to 34%.90 A strengthened corporate mini-
mum tax accompanies the corporate tax rate reductions.91
The 1986 Act also repeals the General Utilities doctrine.92 Corporations
are no longer able to avoid the recognition of gain on certain qualifying dividend
distributions or on distributions or sales of appreciated property in connection
with a complete liquidation. Supporters of the repeal contend it was a necessary
measure to eliminate arbitrary tax results and transactional distortions. 93 Oppo-
nents of the repeal view General Utilities as a necessary feature of the two-tier
tax system that achieved a measure of at least partial integration of the individ-
ual and corporate tax systems. 94
Taxable Income Tax Rate
Not over $50,000 15%
Over $50,000 but not over $75,000 25%
Over $75,000 34%
Id. § 11(b). For taxable years that include July 1, 1987, § 15 prescribes that blended tax rates shall
apply. Id. § 15.
Although corporate tax rates are reduced, the 1986 Act will increase the corporate tax burden
by an estimated $120 billion over the five-year period between 1987 and 1991. H.R. Rep. No. 841,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 2, 11-865 (1986). The rate reduction is more than offset by increases in the
tax base for many corporations, primarily due to repeal of the investment tax credit, accounting
changes, and the elimination of some tax preferences for specific industries.
90. Section 11(b) imposes an additional 5% tax on income between $100,000 and $335,000,
which eliminates the benefits of lower marginal rates on corporate income below $75,000. Corpora-
tions with income over $335,000 are subject to a flat 34% tax rate. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (Supp. IV
1986).
91. Section 701 of the 1986 Act replaces the former add-on corporate minimum tax with a new
corporate alternative minimum tax. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2320-22 (codified at
I.R.C. § 55 (Supp. IV 1986)); see Gould, The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax: A Search for
Equity Through a Maze of Complexity, 64 TAXES 783 (1986); Zimbler, The Corporate Alternative
Minimum Tax: Another Look, 65 TAXES 846 (1987).
92. The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine is accomplished by completely revising §§ 311,
336, and 337, and by amending § 338. Section 336(a) now provides that a corporation generally
recognizes gain or loss on distributions of property with respect to its stock. The repeal of General
Utilities also substantially increases the cost of electing under § 338 to step up the basis of assets in a
stock acquisition by imposing a corporate-level tax on all gain inherent in the assets. See generally
Bonovitz, Impact of the TRA Repeal of General Utilities, 65 J. TAX'N 388 (1986) (discussing nonrec-
ognition strategies remaining after repeal of General Utilites); Hiegel and Schler, Repeal of General
Utilities Doctrine, 33 TAX NOTES 961 (1986) (discussing the effect of repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine on corporate acquisitions); Zolt, The General Utilities Doctrine: Examining the Scope of the
Repeal, 65 TAXES 819 (1987) (discussing taxpayer techniques for disposing of unwanted assets fol-
lowing an acquisition after the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine). The 1986 Act provides for
special transitional rules for small qualified closely held corporations liquidating before January 1,
1989. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 633(d), 100 Stat. 2085, 2278-80.
93. For a review of the arguments that have been advanced in favor of the repeal of the General
Utilities rule, see Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liquida-
tion, 3 TAX REVIsION COMPENDIUM 1643 (House Comm. on Ways and Means 1958); Blum, Taxing
Transfers of Incorporated Businesses: A Proposal for Improvement, 52 TAxES 516 (1974); Wolfman,
Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the General Utilities Doc-
trine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 81 (1985); Yin, General Utilities Repeal: Is Tax Reform Really Going
to Pass It By?, 31 TAX NOTES 1111 (1986).
94. For a review of the arguments against the repeal, see Beck, Distributions in Kind in Corpo-
rate Liquidations: A Defense of General Utilities, 38 TAx LAW. 663 (1985); Gould, General Utilities
Repeal. Tax Reform Should Pass It By, 32 TAX NOTES 147 (1986); Nolan, Taxing Corporate Distri-
butions of Appreciated Property: Repeal of the General Utilities Doctrine and Relief Measures, 22 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 97 (1985).
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2. The 1987 Act Changes
The 1987 Act changes affecting corporate taxation follow the themes estab-
lished in the 1986 Act. One group of changes centers on accounting provisions.
These changes increase the current tax liability of all taxpayers, including corpo-
rations, by restricting opportunities to defer the recognition of income or accel-
erate expenses. Among other changes, the 1987 Act further limits use of the
completed contract method of accounting, 95 prohibits use of the installment
sales method by dealers, 96 requires certain farm corporations to use the accrual
method of accounting,97 and imposes additional restrictions on deductibility of
reserves for vacation pay.98
The second group of changes affects only corporations. The major changes
in this group include the reduction in the intercorporate dividends received de-
duction, 99 the imposition of a LIFO surcharge for regular corporations electing
to be taxed as S corporations, 100 further restrictions on the use of net operating
losses,10 1 and changes in computing a subsidiary's earnings and profits for the
purpose of determining gain or loss on the sale of the subsidiary's stock.10 2
The third group of changes in the 1987 Act aims to reinforce the two-tier
tax system. These provisions seek to prevent taxpayers from avoiding the scope
of the 1986 Act changes. Publicly traded limited partnerships that engage in
"active" operations will be taxed as corporations.10 3 This stops the trend of new
or existing entities adopting the limited partnership form to avoid exposure to a
95. Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10203, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-94 (1987) (amending I.R.C. § 460(a)).
The 1987 Act generally requires that 70% of the items under a long-term contract be reported under
the percentage of completion contract method and that only the remaining 30% be reported under
the taxpayer's normal method of accounting, such as the completed contract method.
96. Id. § 10202(b), 101 Stat. at 1330-388 (amending I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(A) and adding I.R.C.
§ 4530)). For dispositions of property occurring after December 31, 1987, all payments to be re-
ceived from a "dealer disposition" are treated as received in the year of disposition. Dealer disposi-
tions generally include any disposition of personal property by a person who regularly sells or
otherwise disposes of property on the installment plan.
97. Id. § 10205, 101 Stat. at 1330-395 to -397 (amending I.R.C. § 447). These changes require
a family farming corporation to use an accrual method of accounting unless it can establish that its
gross receipts are not in excess of $25 million.
98. Id. § 10201, 101 Stat. at 1330-387 to -388 (repealing I.R.C. §§ 81, 463). The 1987 Act
repeals the reserve method of accounting for vacation pay. Deductions for any tax year are generally
limited to amounts actually paid to employees during the year and amounts vested as of the end of
the tax year and paid to employees within two and a half months after the end of such year.
99. Id. § 10221, 101 Stat. at 1330-408 to -409 (amending I.R.C. §§ 243, 244, 246, 246A). The
intercorporate dividends received deduction is reduced from 80% to 70% if the recipient owns 20%
or less of the value and voting power of the payor corporation.
100. See supra note 65.
101. Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10225(b), 101 Stat. at 1330-413 (amending I.R.C. § 382(h)(2)(B));
id. § 10226, 101 Stat. at 1330-414 (adding I.R.C. § 384). These provisions extend the special limita-
tions on the use of built-in losses following depreciation deductions and limit the use of preacquisi-
tion losses of an acquiring company to offset built-in gains of an acquired company.
102. Id. § 10222, 101 Stat. at 1330-410 (adding I.R.C. § 1503(e)). This provision overrules the
result in Woods Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 274 (1985), and provides that solely for
purposes of determining gain or loss on a disposition, a parent corporation's basis in the stock of a
subsidiary with which it files a consolidated return will be determined by computing the subsidiary's
earnings and profits without regard to such special adjustments as depreciation and other items.
103. Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. at 1330-403 to -405 (adding I.R.C. § 7704). Gener-
ally, publicly traded partnerships are treated as corporations for federal income tax purposes unless
90% or more of their gross income is passive, such as interest, dividends, real property rents, gains
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corporate-level tax. The 1987 Act also limits techniques whereby an acquiring
corporation'disposes of unwanted appreciated assets, either directly or indi-
rectly, without recognizing corporate-level gain. t°4
3. Effect on Compensating Biases in the Tax System
a. Bias Against Capital in Corporate Form
Each of the 1986 Act changes increases the relative cost of operating in
corporate form. Reversing the relative relationship of the individual and corpo-
rate tax rates probably has the greatest impact. Historically, the maximum indi-
vidual rate has exceeded the maximum corporate rate. By setting the maximum
corporate tax rate at 34% and the maximum individual tax rate at 28%, Con-
gress reversed a ranking that has existed since the institution of the individual
income tax.
Also important in examining the heightened bias against holding capital in
corporate form are changes in the combined individual and corporate tax rates.
Income earned and distributed by corporations after the 1986 Act bears a com-
bined marginal tax rate of 52.48%.105 Because no entity-level tax applies to
partnership income, partners are taxed at a maximum 28% of their allocable
share of partnership income. This results in a tax rate differential of 24.48%, or
stated more dramatically, the combined individual and corporate tax liability is
87.4% greater than the partner's liability. Before the 1986 Act, the aggregate
individual-level and corporate-level tax on distributed corporate earnings was
73%, compared to the maximum tax rate on partnership earnings of 50%.106
This results in a rate differential of 23%, or a 46% greater tax liability than that
incurred under the partnership form.
Eliminating the capital gain rate preference also increases the relative tax
from certain dispositions of real property and certain capital or § 1231 assets, and certain oil and gas
and commodities activities.
The 1987 Act made publicly traded partnerships that are not taxed as corporations less attrac-
tive by requiring the passive loss rules of § 469 to be applied separately for each partnership and by
treating any income earned by an exempt organization from a publicly traded partnership as gross
income derived from an unrelated trade or business. See id. § 10212, 101 Stat. at 1330-405 to -406
(amending I.R.C. § 469(k)); id. § 10213, 101 Stat. at 1330-406 (amending I.R.C. § 512(c)).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61. Section 10223 of the 1987 Act limits the use of
the "mirror subsidiary" technique by requiring a liquidating corporation to recognize gain on distri-
butions made in complete liquidation unless the distributee corporation owns directly 80% of the
liquidating corporation. The 1987 Act also prevents use of the § 355 nonrecognition provisions for
spin-offs and § 304 related corporation redemption provisions to transfer unwanted appreciated as-
sets outside of the acquiring group without recognizing a corporate-level gain. See Pub. L. No. 100-
203, § 10223, 101 Stat. at 1330-411 to -412 (amending I.R.C. §§ 337(c), 355(b)(2)(D)(i)-(ii), and
adding I.R.C. § 304(b)(4)).
105. For example, $100 of corporate earnings after the 1986 Act will be subject to a corporate
tax of $34 (assuming a 34% corporate rate), leaving $66 available for dividend distribution. The $66
dividend will be subject to an individual tax of $18.48 (assuming a 28% individual rate), resulting in
an aggregate tax liability of $52.48. If the individual marginal tax rate is 33%, then the aggregate
tax liability would be $55.78.
106. Before the 1986 Act, $100 of corporate earnings was subject to a maximum corporate tax of
$46 (assuming a 46% corporate rate), leaving $54 available for dividend distribution. The $54 divi-
dend was subject to an individual tax of $27 (assuming a 50% individual tax rate), resulting in an
aggregate tax liability of $73.
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costs of operating in corporate form. The ability to extract funds at the cost of a
capital gain tax, whether by sale, liquidation, or bailout transaction, lessened the
tax penalty imposed on corporations by the two-tier tax system. Before the 1986
Act, income earned and distributed by a corporation in a transaction qualifying
for capital gain treatment was taxed at a combined rate of 56.8%,107 or just
6.8% greater than the 50% individual-level tax on partnership income.
Repealing the General Utilities doctrine also increases the tax cost of oper-
ating in corporate form. Imposing a corporate-level tax on appreciated assets on
distribution or liquidation will discourage taxpayers from both adopting the cor-
porate form, and liquidating to leave the corporate form.10 8 The tax burden
differential between corporate and noncorporate investment increases because
only corporations are subject to this layer of taxation.
The following examples illustrate the combined effects of changing the tax
rates and eliminating the favorable capital gain rate preference. These calcula-
tions demonstrate the disparate impact of the 1986 Act changes in a general
fashion; they do not constitute a comprehensive examination of the effect of the
1986 Act changes. Comparisons between pre- and post-1986 Act tax rates and
after-tax future values are particularly dangerous because of differences in the
effective and nominal tax rates borne by individuals and corporations, 0 9 as well
as potentially significant differences in the determination of an entity's taxable
income before and after the 1986 Act. 1 0 Nor do the examples reflect the effects
of either the various strategies used by taxpayers to minimize the tax cost of
operating within the two-tier tax system"' or the large holdings by foreign and
tax-exempt shareholders whose tax consequences may be much different than
the examples suggest.
Let us make the following assumptions in examining how the 1986 Act
107. The combined tax would be a $46 corporate-level tax and a $10.80 individual-level tax
(assuming a 20% tax rate and a distribution of $54).
108. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the additional revenue from corporations
for years 1987-1991 from the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine will be approximately $1.7
billion. H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 2, at 11-871 (1986). This estimate is decep-
tively small. It does not include the lost revenue resulting from liquidations that probably would
have occurred but for the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
109. The nominal tax rate is the statutory rate. The effective tax rate is the percentage reduction
in the rate of return due to taxation. See Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy?, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 780 (1974) (illustrating various methods for computing effective and average tax rates, and
evaluating the use of effective tax rates as an analytical tool); Citizens for Tax Justice, supra note 51
(study of 275 major corporations; 129 of these companies paid no taxes or received rebates in at least
one of the years 1981-84); Weiss, Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 380 (1979)
(discussing conceptual and methodological differences in computation of effective tax rates); see also
R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 424-26 (4th ed.
1984) (effective tax rate depends on the nominal rate, depreciation rules, investment credit provi-
sions, rates of inflation, and characteristics of particular investments). For purposes of this analysis,
all income is assumed to be subject to tax at the maximum marginal statutory rate but not subject to
the 5% surcharge imposed on individuals and corporations.
110. The major thrust of the 1986 Act was the broadening of the tax base while reducing tax
rates. Comparisons therefore can be deceptive because increases in an entity's taxable income may
compensate for reductions in applicable rates.
111. The absolute and relative results would be much different for taxpayers, for example, who
hold stock until death and use I.R.C. § 1014 to escape shareholder-level tax on predeath
appreciation.
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changes affect the decision whether to invest in the noncorporate or corporate
form:
Pre-1986 Act Post-1986 Act
Pre-tax Rate of Return (r) 10% 10%
Individual Tax Rate (p) 50% 28%
Corporate Tax Rate (c) 46% 34%
Capital Gain Tax Rate (k) 20% 28%
Initial Wealth (w) $100 $100
Number of Years (y) 10 10
Let us further assume that the same rate of return is available to corporate
and noncorporate investors1 12 and that the market has not yet adjusted to make
the after-tax return on corporate equity equal to the after-tax return on
noncorporate investment.1 13 Finally, the analysis excludes the quantitative ef-
fects of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
The individual investor has three investment choices:' 14
(1) Noncorporate Investment-invest directly in the income-
producing asset so that only an individual-level tax applies to income
from the investment. 15
(2) Corporate Equity with Annual Dividend Distributions-in-
vest in equity of a corporation holding the income-producing asset,
with earnings distributed to the investor in the form of annual divi-
dends. The dividends are taxable to the investor at the individual tax
rate. The corporation's earnings are taxed at the corporate rate with
no deduction for dividends paid.' 1 6
(3) Corporate Equity with No Dividend Distributions- invest
in equity with earnings retained in corporate form and then paid out to
the investor in a lump sum at the end of ten years in a transaction
qualifying for capital gain treatment. The corporation is taxed at the
corporate rate on earnings and receives no deduction for amounts paid
112. See Warren, supra note 9, at 724-25. The assumption, stated somewhat differently, requires
that the income-producing asset yield the same rate of return in or out of corporate form.
113. Warren, supra note 9, at 725. As discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 8-15, the
corporate tax may reduce the after-tax return for capital in corporate form resulting in relatively less
investment in the corporate sector versus the noncorporate sector until the rates of return become
equal.
114. The framework for the analysis of investment alternatives and financing alternatives bor-
rows heavily from Warren, supra note 9, at 721-35, who in turn acknowledges M. KING, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE CORPORATION (1977); Flemming, .4 Reappraisal of the Corporation Income Tax, 6
J. PUB. ECON. 163 (1976); King, Taxation and the Cost of Capital, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 21 (1974);
Stiglitz, Corporation Tax, supra note 9; Stiglitz, Taxation, supra note 9. My approach differs from
Warren's approach, however, in that any funds distributed from corporations are assumed to be
reinvested in noncorporate assets, rather than reinvested in corporate form. See id. at 722.
115. The future value formula for noncorporate investment is w[l +r(1-p)],. Warren, supra
note 9, at 723 Table 1.
116. The future value formula for corporate equity with annual dividend distributions, assuming






in redemption of equity in year ten.117
Table 1 summarizes the after-tax future values of different investment alterna-
tives for pre- and post-1986 Act rates:118
Table 1
AFTER-TAX FUTURE VALUE OF INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES
Pre-1986 (Percent of Post-1986 (Percent of
Alternative Act Rates Alternative 1) Act Rates Alternative 1)
(1) Noncorporate Investment $162.89 (100%) $200.42 (100%)
(2) Corporate Equity with Annual $133.96 (82%) $166.28 (83%)
Dividend Distributions
(3) Corporate Equity with No Dividend $155.36 (95%) $164.43 (82%)
Distributions
For Alternative 1 (Noncorporate Investment), the before-tax return of 10%
from the income-producing asset bears the relevant individual tax rates. 119
Whether or not the after-tax future value for a particular noncorporate invest-
ment increases under the post-1986 Act tax regime depends on the investment's
change in taxable income from the 1986 Act changes. The reduction in the
corporate rate does not affect the after-tax amounts because the investor makes
the investment directly without placing the assets in corporate form.
The results for Alternative 2 (Corporate Equity with Annual Dividend Dis-
tributions) reflect the impact of the 1986 Act changes. Because of the two-tier
tax system, this alternative historically has been the most costly method of dis-
tributing corporate earnings to shareholders. After the 1986 Act, however, this
alternative yields a greater after-tax amount than pre-1986 Act rate Alternative
1.120 Although the combined post-1986 individual and corporate tax rate
(52.48%) nominally exceeds the individual tax rate (50%) applied to pre-1986
Act Alternative 1, the higher after-tax amount for the post-1986 Act Alternative
2 results from the increased earnings arising from the lower tax rate on
noncorporate investment of funds paid out as dividends. 121 Somewhat surpris-
ingly, at least under these restrictive assumptions, the 1986 Act changes do not
117. The future value formula for corporate equity with no dividend distributions is
wjk+(1-k)[l+r(1-c)]1j. Warren, supra note 9, at 723 Table 1.
118. In 1981, when Professor Warren did his calculations, the maximum personal tax rate was
70%, and he assumed a 50% corporate tax rate. To illustrate the disparate effect of the individual
and corporate tax system on high and low bracket taxpayers, Warren assumed both a 30% and a
70% individual tax rate. See Warren, supra note 9, at 722-23.
119. For historical perspective and to aid in comparison with Warren's results, it is interesting to
examine results under the pre-1981 tax regime assuming 30% and 70% individual tax rates, a 50%
corporate rate, and a 10-year investment horizon. The after-tax future value for a 30% individual
tax rate is $196.72, and for a 70% individual tax rate is $134.39. Warren, supra note 9, at 723.
120. The after-tax future value results under the pre-1981 tax regime for a 10-year investment
are as follows: for a 30% individual tax rate, $148.36 and for a 70% individual tax rate, $117.20
(assuming distributed funds are reinvested in noncorporate form).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07 for a comparison of the combined marginal tax
rates and the rate imposed on single-entity income before and after the 1986 Act rate changes. The
results in the text depend on the assumption, which is probably unrealistic, that the tax base remains
constant. A 35% increase in taxable income after the 1986 Act roughly offsets the 1986 Act rate
1988]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
greatly alter the relative after-tax future values between Alternatives 1 and 2; the
after-tax future value of Alternative 2 remains at roughly 82% of the value of
Alternative 1.
Alternative 3 (Corporate Equity with No Dividend Distributions) yields
perhaps the most interesting results. First, the 1986 Act's reduction of the indi-
vidual and corporate tax rates more than compensates for eliminating the capital
gain rate preference.1 22 Second, and quite startling, the retention strategy no
longer is preferred over the distribution approach.1 23 The higher corporate tax
rate imposed on undistributed earnings generally outweighs the advantage of
deferral of the individual-level tax. Thus, high-bracket taxpayers cannot use the
corporate form as a tax shelter.1 24 Before the 1986 Act, Alternative 3 yielded an
after-tax future value that was 95% of the value for Alternative 1. Following
the 1986 Act changes, Alternative 3 now yields only 82% of the after-tax future
value for Alternative 1.
In summary, the tax cost of operating in the corporate form as compared to
the noncorporate form increases greatly after the 1986 Act. Assuming a ten-
year investment horizon and no dividend distributions, for post-1986 Act rates
investments in corporate form need to earn a 13.83% rate of return to yield the
same after-tax future value amount as noncorporate investments yielding
10%.125 Under pre-1986 Act rates, investments in corporate form (assuming no
dividend distributions) needed to earn only an 11.06% rate of return to achieve
an after-tax future value equal to noncorporate investments yielding 10%.126
Changing the individual and corporate tax rates and the capital gain rate
preference assumptions has some interesting effects on the different investment
alternatives. For example, setting both the individual and corporate tax rates at
34% results in after-tax future values for Alternative 1 of $189.48 and for Alter-
natives 2 and 3 of $159.06.127 Equalizing the rates thus eliminates the difference
between the corporate equity alternatives but narrows the gap only slightly be-
reductions. Changing the assumption to reinvesting distributed funds in corporate equity reduces
the after-tax value for post-1986 Act Alternative 2 to $159.08.
122. Assuming no deferral, the pre-1986 Act combined corporate tax and shareholder capital
gain tax rate is 56.8%. This compares unfavorably to the post-1986 Act combined individual and
corporate tax rate of 52.48%, again assuming no change in the tax base.
123. One of the key factors influencing this comparison is the assumption that funds distributed
are reinvested in noncorporate form yielding the same rate of return as corporate investment but
subject to only one level of tax at a lower tax rate.
124. The after-tax future value results under the pre-1981 tax regime for a 10-year investment
are, for a 30% individual tax rate, $155.34 and for a 70% individual tax rate, $145.28. Comparing
these results to the result for Alternative 1 (Noncorporate Investment), which is $134.39, illustrates
the advantage to the high-bracket individual taxpayer of using the corporate form. See Warren,
supra note 9, at 723.
125. The equivalent rate of return with the 100% payout assumption is 13.46%.
126. The equivalent rate of return for pre-1986 Act rates under the 100% payout assumption is
16.06%. For a pre-1986 Act analysis of the pretax rates of return necessary to achieve equal after-
tax rates of return for corporate and noncorporate investment, see Shoven, The Incidence and Effi-
ciency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1261 (1976).
127. The effect of the two-tier tax system can be isolated by assuming equal rates for individual
and corporate taxpayers and no rate preference for capital gains. The after-tax future values for
Alternatives 2 and 3 are about 84% of Alternative 1. See also Table 2 of Warren, supra note 9, at
724 (comparing investment alternatives assuming a 50% individual and corporate tax rate).
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tween noncorporate and corporate investment alternatives. Reinstating the cap-
ital gain rate preference more effectively narrows the gap between noncorporate
and corporate investment alternatives. Assuming a maximum capital gain tax
rate of 20%, Alternative 3 will yield 86% of Alternative 1.128 This value com-
pares unfavorably to the 95% result achieved under the pre-1986 tax rates. The
reduced effectiveness of using the 20% capital gain rate preference to equalize
returns for noncorporate and corporate investments results from the 1986 Act's
reduction of the individual tax rate. The spread between the individual and cap-
ital gain tax rate is no longer sufficient to compensate for the extra tax at the
corporate level.
b. Bias in Favor of Debt Financing
As discussed earlier, corporations have three alternatives to finance new
investments: using retained earnings, issuing debt, or issuing new equity. 129
The corporate tax system favors debt financing over other types of financing
because interest is deductible; no corresponding deduction exists for earnings
retained or dividends paid. In the pre-1986 Act tax regime, however, there were
compensating biases that favored retained earnings financing and new equity
financing over debt financing. 130
The 1986 Act affects financing decisions in several ways. First, reducing
the individual tax rate below the corporate tax rate creates incentives to shift
income from the corporation to the shareholder. Debt owed by the corporation
to the shareholder achieves exactly this result. Interest on the debt decreases the
corporation's income and increases the shareholder's income; this results in the
substitution of the shareholder's tax rate for the corporation's tax rate. Second,
the 1986 Act substantially reduces the advantages previously accorded retained
earnings financing and new equity financing. A higher tax rate applies to earn-
ings retained than to distributions, and the 1986 Act eliminates the ability to
extract earnings at capital gain rates. Only the potential to defer shareholder-
level tax remains.
Table 2 summarizes the after-tax future values of the financing alternatives
before and after the 1986 Act changes. In all alternatives I assume the initial
$100 is already in corporate form. The first alternative involves financing the
new investment through the $100 of retained earnings. All subsequent earnings
remain in the corporation until the end of the ten-year investment period. At
that point, the earnings are paid out either as a dividend, subject to ordinary
income rates, or in redemption, which before the 1986 Act qualified for
128. Assuming individual and corporate tax rates of 28% and 34%, respectively, the after-tax
future value for Alternative 3 is $171.59 and for Alternative 1 is $200.42. If the individual and
corporate tax rates are set at 34%, the after-tax future value for Alternative 3 ($171.59) is 91% of
the value of Alternative 1 ($189.48).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. The favored status resulted from the generally
lower rates applied to earnings retained in the corporation, the deferral of shareholder-level tax until
earnings were distributed, and the ability to extract funds at capital gain rates.
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favorable capital gain rates. 131 The second alternative assumes the $100 re-
tained earnings is distributed in year one, either as a dividend or in redemption,
and the after-tax proceeds are loaned back to the corporation. The debt is re-
tired in year ten. The after-tax interest payments are reinvested in new debt.' 32
The third alternative assumes earnings are distributed in year one, again as
either a dividend or in redemption, and that the after-tax proceeds are invested
in new equity. Subsequent earnings are then currently distributed as dividends,
with the shareholder investing after-tax amounts in noncorporate assets. 13 3 The
final alternative is identical to the previous alternative except that subsequent
earnings are retained in the corporation. The corporation redeems the stock in
year ten. 134
131. The future value formula for retained earnings is w(l-t 0)[l+r(l-c)]Y where t1o equals the
tax rate on the distribution in year 10 (p if dividend transaction, k if redemption transaction). The
after-tax future value results under the pre-1981 tax regime for a 30% individual tax rate and 70%
individual tax rate are $143.34 and $117.28, respectively, for the redemption alternative, and $114.02
and $48.87, respectively, for the dividend distribution alternative. Warren, supra note 9, at 731.
132. The future value formula for debt financing is w(l-t)[l+r(l-p)]Y where to equals the tax
rate on the initial distribution (p if dividend transaction, k if redemption transaction). The assump-
tion that after-tax interest payments are reinvested in new debt yields the same return as if payments
are reinvested in noncorporate assets; in each case, the rate of return is assumed to be 10% and
earnings are subject only to an individual-level tax. The after-tax future value results under the pre-
1981 tax regime for a 30% individual tax rate and a 70% individual tax rate are $173.11 and $96.76,
respectively, for the redemption alternative, and $137.70 and $40.32, respectively, for the dividend
alternative. Warren, supra note 9, at 731.
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A comparison of the pre-1986 Act alternatives reveals that Alternative 1
(Retained Earnings Financing) has a slightly higher after-tax future value than
Alternative 2 (Debt Financing). This value results from the pre-1986 Act corpo-
rate tax rate (46%) being slightly lower than the pre-1986 individual tax rate
(50%). The after-tax future values for Alternative 3 (Equity Financing with
Current Dividend Distributions) and Alternative 4 (Equity Financing with Sub-
sequent Earnings Retained) are lower. 136 The low total for Alternative 3 reflects
earnings bearing the full brunt of the two-tier tax system. Alternative 4, at least,
has the benefits of deferring shareholder-level tax until the year ten redemption
and subsequent taxation at capital gain rates.
The post-1986 Act results yield a different ranking. Alternative 2 (Debt
Financing) achieves the highest after-tax future value. This value results from
the individual tax rate (28%) being reduced below the corporate rate (34%).
The debt strategy allows the individual tax rate to be substituted for the corpo-
135. The after-tax future values if the after-tax proceeds are reinvested in corporate equity are
$104.42 and $65.26 for distributions in redemption and as dividends, respectively, for pre-1986 Act
tax rates, and $114.54 for post-1986 Act rates.
136. The after-tax future value results for Alternative 3 (Equity Financing with Current Divi-
dend Distributions) under the pre-1981 tax regime for a 30% individual tax rate and for a 70%
individual tax rate are $130.55 and $84.38, respectively, for the redemption alternative, and $103.85
and $35.16, respectively, for the dividend distribution alternative.
The after-tax future value results for Alternative 4 (Equity Financing with Subsequent Earnings
Retained) under the pre-1981 tax regime for a 30% individual tax rate and for a 70% individual tax
rate are $136.70 and $104.60, respectively, for the redemption alternative, and $108.74 and $43.58,
respectively, for the dividend distribution alternative. Warren, supra note 9, at 731.
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rate tax rate. Although the tax benefit of debt decreases because the 1986 Act
reduces the corporate tax rate from 46% to 34%, the relative advantage of debt
compared to other financing alternatives increases. Alternative 4 (Equity Fi-
nancing with Subsequent Earnings Retained) yields the lowest after-tax future
value. Retaining funds in the corporation results in the application of the higher
corporate tax rate to subsequent earnings.
The relative after-tax values among Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 of Table 2-
both before and after the 1986 Act-are identical to the relative after-tax values
among Alternatives 1, 2 and 3 of Table 1. This identity occurs because the
financing alternatives of Debt Financing, Equity Financing with Current Divi-
dend Distributions, and Equity Financing with Subsequent Earnings Retained
bear the same tax burdens (except for the tax on the initial distribution) as the
investment alternatives of Noncorporate Investment, Corporate Equity with An-
nual Dividend Distributions, and Corporate Equity with No Dividend Distribu-
tions, respectively. 137 The conclusions are therefore similar. The discrimination
against alternatives that distribute funds rather than retain funds in the corpora-
tion has been eliminated. More importantly, the gap has widened between debt
financing and equity financing, with the alternative of Corporate Equity with No
Dividend Distributions being the alternative most adversely affected by the 1986
Act changes.
Changing the individual and corporate tax rates and the capital gain rate
preference assumptions has several interesting effects on the different financing
alternatives. For example, equalizing the individual and corporate tax rates
yields the same after-tax values for Alternatives 1 and 2.138 Adopting equal
rates, however, narrows the gap only slightly between Alternatives I and 2 and
equity financing Alternatives 3 and 4.139 As was the case with investment alter-
natives, reinstating the capital gain rate preference does not substantially close
the gap between Alternative 4 and Alternatives 1 and 2.140
c. Bias in Favor of Retained Earnings
Under the pre-1986 Act tax regime, the strategy of currently distributing
corporate earnings as dividends has been the most costly method of distributing
corporate funds to shareholders. 141 The high aggregate tax cost resulted from
the combination of tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels and a histor-
137. Compare formula in note 115 with formula in note 132; compare formula in note 116 with
formula in note 133; compare formula in note 117 with formula in note 134.
138. Assuming individual and corporate tax rates of 34%, the after-tax future value for Alterna-
tives 1 and 2 is $125.06. This is the balance described by Professor Andrews, see supra note 37.
139. The after-tax future value for Alternatives 3 and 4 is $104.98-about 84% of the value for
Alternatives 1 and 2.
140. Assuming individual and corporate tax rates of 28% and 34%, respectively, the after-tax
future value for Alternative 4 distribution in redemption ($137.27) is about 86% of Alternative 2($160.34) and 91% of Alternative 1. ($151.59). If the individual and corporate tax rates are set at
34%, the after-tax future value for Alternative 4 ($137.27) is about 91% of the value for Alternatives
1 and 2 ($151.59).
141. See generally, J. BRrITrAIN, CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY 74-99 (1966) (examining the
effects of individual income tax rates and liberal depreciation allowances on dividend policy).
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ically high individual tax rate applied to dividend distributions. In response, the
retained earnings strategy was developed.
The 1986 Act changes affect dividend strategy in three ways. First, by set-
ting the maximum individual tax rate below the maximum corporate tax rate,
the changes result in a 6% penalty (34%-28%) for keeping funds in corporate
form. Second, the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine creates the potential
for an additional corporate-level tax on asset appreciation (not reflected in the
calculations). Finally, the repeal of the capital gain rate preference eliminates
the ability to remove accumulated funds at favorable rates.
Table 3 below illustrates the results of several dividend strategies for differ-
ent investment periods under the pre-and post-1986 Act tax regimes: 142
Table 3
AFTER-TAX FUTURE VALUE OF DIVIDEND STRATEGIES
Pre-1986 Act Rates Post-1986 Act Rates
Investment Horizon (Years) 5 10 20 5 10 20
(1) Corporate Equity with 100% $114.92 $133.96 $189.28 $127.44 $166.28 $299.12
payout
(2) Corporate Equity with 50% $119.25 $143.42 $212.03 $127.28 $165.43 $293.93
payout
(3) Corporate Equity with 25% $121.60 $149.04 $228.32 $127.20 $164.95 $290.55
payout
(4) Corporate Equity with 0% $124.06 $155.36 $249.03 $127.11 $164.43 $286.51
payout
There are no surprises in the pre-1986 Act results. As the percentage of
earnings retained in the corporation increases, so does the after-tax future value.
The longer the investment horizon, the greater the difference in after-tax future
values for different dividend strategies. For example, under the five-year invest-
ment horizon, Alternative 1 (Corporate Equity with 100% Payout) yields about
93% of the after-tax future value as Alternative 4 (Corporate Equity with No
Payout), but only 76% of the value for the 20-year horizon.
The post-1986 Act results illustrate the decimation of the retained earnings
strategy. Alternative 1 yields the highest after-tax future value. The variations
among the results for the different dividend strategies and the different time ho-
rizons are remarkably small. For the five-year investment horizon, the value for
the lowest ranking alternative is 99.74% of the value for the highest ranking
alternative. Because the 1986 Act narrowed the differences among individual,
corporate, and capital gain tax rates, tax considerations may no longer strongly
142. The general future value formula for corporate equity with partial dividend distribution is
y
wlk+(l -k)[1+r(--c)(1-d)]Y+rd(1-c)(--p) x I [1 +r(-c)(1-d)]n--[1+r(1 -p)]Y-n I },
n=1
where d equals the fraction of after-corporate tax profits distributed as dividends.
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influence dividend strategy.143
Changing the individual and corporate tax rates and the capital gain rate
preference assumptions yields interesting consequences for dividend strategies.
Equalizing the individual and corporate tax rates eliminates the variations in
values for different dividend strategies. Reinstating the capital gain rate prefer-
ence would again create incentives for keeping funds in corporate form. The
incentives would be greater the larger the spread between the capital gain rate
and the individual tax rate. Thus, there will be a greater effect when the individ-
ual rate is 34% than when the rate is 28%. 144
B. Effect of 1986 and 1987 Acts' Changes on Taxpayer Strategies
The 1986 Act, which specifically rejected modest integration proposals,
greatly encourages taxpayers to adopt self-help integration measures. 145 The
1987 Act furthers that trend. The revised strategies outlined below all seek to
avoid the full economic impact of the two-tier tax system as reinforced by the
1986 and 1987 Acts.
1. Avoiding the Corporate-Level Tax
The 1986 and 1987 Acts encourage taxpayers to avoid corporate form ini-
tially. Never before has the tax bias against operating as a regular corporation
been so great. For both newly organized and existing closely held corporations,
electing S corporation treatment will be extremely tempting when a corporation
can meet the qualifications. 146 An S election achieves almost complete integra-
tion for qualifying corporations.147 Although the limitations on number of
shareholders and classes of stock have limited the use of S corporations in the
past, the increased advantages of generally avoiding a corporate-level tax will
result in increased creativity in structuring transactions to satisfy S corporation
requirements. ' 48
143. This does not mean, however, that taxpayers will abandon such dividend-minimizing tech-
niques as disguising equity as debt, excess compensation to shareholder-employees, and optional
share repurchase plans.
144. Assuming a 10-year investment horizon and individual and corporate tax rates of 34% and
capital gain tax rate of 20%, the after-tax future value for the lowest ranking alternative (Alternative
1-$159.06) is about 93% of the highest ranking alternative (Alternative 4--$171.59). Changing the
individual tax rate assumption to 28% yields a value for Alternative 1 ($166.28) that is about 97% of
the value for Alternative 4 ($171.59).
145. See Canellos, Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By Default, 35 TAx NoTEs 999
(1987).
146. See supra note 48.
147. S corporations that were taxed as regular corporations before making the election, however,
are treated more as separately taxable entities than as conduits under the 1986 Act. I.R.C. § 1374
(Supp. IV 1986) imposes a corporate-level tax on built-in gains accruing during the period the corpo-
ration was taxed as a regular C corporation for those corporations that failed to make an S election
before January 1, 1987. For all S corporations, the 1986 Act also extends the imposition of a corpo-
rate-level tax on distributions of appreciated property whether as dividend distributions or distribu-
tions in complete liquidation. Id. § 1363(d).
148. For example, joint venture arrangements between S corporations as well as between S cor-
porations and regular corporations or partnerships, will become more popular. See generally Krane
and Gallagher, Preserving Subchapter S Status in Partnership Arrangements and Acquisition Transac-
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The rigid requirements of Subchapter S may be avoided by operating as a
partnership pursuant to Subehapter K of the Code. Subehapter K provides sev-
eral tax benefits unavailable under Subehapter S.149 An existing corporation's
assets may be transferred to a partnership through either liquidation or spin-off.
Liquidations became more costly after December 31, 1986, except for those cor-
porations that come within the transitional small business exception to the re-
peal of the General Utilities doctrine. 150 The immediate tax cost of the
liquidation to the corporation and the shareholder must be balanced against the
tax benefit of avoiding the corporate-level tax and the increased depreciation and
amortization deductions resulting from a step-up in basis in connection with the
liquidation. In a partnership spin-off, the corporation transfers assets in ex-
change for a preferred interest in a partnership and the shareholders own the
remaining interests directly. The preferred interest could be entitled to a prior-
ity on cash distributions and a liquidation preference, while the remaining inter-
ests would be entitled to future appreciation. Any future appreciation in the
transferred assets would thus escape the corporate-level tax.
The alternatives available to publicly held corporations for avoiding the
corporate-level tax are more restricted. Because of the unavailability of S corpo-
ration treatment to entities with more than thirty-five shareholders, the primary
alternative for avoiding the two-tier tax system through entity classification
before the 1987 Act was the master limited partnership form. 15 1 In the past few
years, several different types of master limited partnerships have developed. The
roll-up and the roll-out were the first types of master limited partnerships to
gain popularity. The roll-up was used primarily in the oil and gas industry to
consolidate several relatively small, burnt-out partnerships into a single master
limited partnership. 152 The roll-out partnership usually resulted from a corpo-
ration contributing substantial assets to a newly-formed limited partnership in
tdons, 65 TAXES 862 (1987) (examining the viability of partnership arrangements with S corporations
in light of the statutory requirements for S corporation qualification).
149. Four major advantages of partnership tax treatment not available under Subchapter S are:
(i) partners, unlike shareholders in S corporations, acquire additional outside basis in their partner-
ship interests equal to their proportionate share of partnership debt (I.R.C. §§ 722, 752(a) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985)); (ii) incoming partners who purchase their interests at a premium may be able to
step up their allowable inside bases of partnership assets to the extent of the premium if the partner-
ship has a § 754 election in effect (I.R.C. §§ 754, 743(b), 755 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); (iii) the
partnership is not subject to the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, so no partnership-level tax
will be imposed on the distribution of appreciated property; and (iv) the special allocation provisions
of § 704(b) (1982) afford greater flexibility in allocating economic and tax interests than is available
to S corporations, because of the S corporation restriction of one class of stock.
150. See supra note 92 (citing the transition rules).
151. Master limited partnerships are partnerships whose interests are publicly traded. For a
discussion of the advantages of the master limited partnership form after the 1986 Act, see Freeman,
Some Early Strategies for the Methodical Disincorporation of America After the Tax Reform Act of
1986: Grafting Partnerships onto C Corporations, Running Amok with the Master Limited Partner-
ships Concept, and Generally Endeavoring to Defeat the Intention of the Draftsmen of the Repeal of
General Utilities, 64 TAxEs 962, 967-89 (1986); Limberg, Master Limited Partnerships Offer Signifi-
cant Benefits, 65 J. TAX'N 84 (1986); Sheppard, Sleeping Dogr Publicly Traded Limited Partnerships
Come of Age, 34 TAX NoTEs 1254 (1987).
152. The partners in the smaller partnerships exchange their interests for interests in the master
limited partnership. This exchange allows the original partners to convert their holdings into a more
marketable form to facilitate later disposition.
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exchange for a general partnership interest and most of the limited partnership
interests. The limited partnership interests could then be retained, sold to the
public, or distributed to shareholders as a dividend or in partial or complete
liquidation. 153
Before the 1987 Act, master limited partnerships were used primarily in
initial public offerings and leveraged buyouts. After the 1986 Act, the use of the
partnership form reflected a decision dictated entirely by the increased tax costs
of operating in corporate form. The master limited partnership form avoided
the corporate-level tax, as well as the operating restrictions imposed by other
types of flow-through entities allowed by the Code.' 54 The 1987 Act limits the
use of master limited partnerships for those publicly held entities engaged in
active operations by taxing such entities as corporations. Subject to some quali-
fications and generous transition rules, publicly held entities can no longer avoid
the corporate-level tax by organizing as a limited partnership. 55
The post-1986 Act tax system places increased pressure on trying to extract
corporate-level funds through deductible expenses. 156 For closely held corpora-
tions, even greater incentives exist for disguised dividend transactions. For
those entities unable to avoid corporate status and not satisfying the require-
ments for S corporation treatment, increased incentives exist to siphon off corpo-
rate income. Several different approaches are available. Shareholders can
acquire property-either property already owned by the corporation or new
property-and lease it to the corporation. Alternatively, corporate assets could
be spun off into partnerships and either leased back to the corporation or oper-
ated independently to generate income outside the corporate tax structure.
The 1986 Act changes lead to increased substitution of debt for equity in
corporations' capital structures. 157 The relative tax advantages of debt financing
increase under the post-1986 Act tax regime because the individual tax rate is
now lower than the corporate rate and because some of the biases in the individ-
153. The roll-out was initially used for passive assets, such as oil-and gas-producing properties,
which generated a relatively predictable cash flow and required little management activity. Subse-
quent roll-outs involved active businesses that required substantial management activity and contin-
ued reinvestment. See Sheppard, supra note 151, at 1256 (listing of publicly traded limited
partnerships by type (e.g. roll-out, roll-up) and by business activity). The roll-out then gained popu-
larity as a takeover defense, whereby treasured assets could be spun off into a limited partnership out
of the reach of corporate raiders. The popularity of the roll-out has declined following the repeal of
the General Utilities doctrine. Although the roll-out previously could be accomplished at relatively
little tax cost, the imposition of corporate-level tax on the distribution of appreciated assets substan-
tially increases the cost of this technique.
154. The Code allows flow-through treatment for passive investments in real estate (REITs),
mortgages (REMICs), and portfolio securities (RICs), but imposes restrictions to qualify for such
treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 856-860, 860A-860G, 851-855 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The master lim-
ited partnership form allows the benefits of pass-through treatment to be achieved without having to
satisfy the qualification requirements.
155. See supra note 103.
156. Deductible compensation, for example, will save the corporation a corporate-level tax of 34
cents for each dollar of compensation, while costing the employee-shareholder an individual-level
tax of only 28 cents for each dollar received. Similarly, increased incentives will exist for disguising
equity as debt to obtain deductible interest payments.




ual tax system in favor of retained earnings and new equity financing have been
eliminated. 158
Following repeal of the General Utilities doctrine but before passage of the
1987 Act, taxpayers structured transactions to avoid the reach of the repeal.
Mirror transaction techniques received the most publicity. These transactions
were structured to avoid corporate-level gain on the disposition of unwanted
assets following an acquisition. 159 Several other techniques were crafted to
avoid the full impact of the repeal.1 60 These techniques shared many similar
elements. The unwanted assets remained in corporate form and retained their
historic bases. The 1987 Act, however, effectively destroyed the strategies for
avoiding recognition of corporate-level gain on the disposition of unwanted as-
sets following an acquisition. 161
2. Deferral Techniques
With the elimination of the capital gain rate preference, deferral techniques
have become the major technique to minimize taxes.1 62 The 1986 Act encour-
ages taxpayers to structure transactions to fall within nonrecognition provisions,
primarily the reorganization provisions. Three factors combine to increase the
attractiveness of tax-free reorganizations.1 63 First, elimination of the capital
158. See supra text accompanying notes 135-37.
159. See Kiegman, Do Mirror Transactions Survive the 1986 Act?, 66 J. TAX'N 206 (1987); Shep-
pard, Mirror Moves: Life Without the General Utilities Rule, 32 TAx NOTES 847 (1986); Zolt, supra
note 92, at 824-27. The mirror transaction is best described by example. Assume P desires to ac-
quire T stock for $200 and that T has two operating divisions, D1 and D2, each with a fair market
value of $100 and a basis to T of $50. P wishes to keep D1, but dispose of D2 shortly after the
acquisition. P desires to compute the gain on the sale of D2 based on its pro rata share of the
purchase price ($100) rather than on T's historic basis in D2 ($50). Hoping to accomplish this
result, P forms two subsidiaries, S1 and S2, and contributes $100 to each subsidiary. S1 and S2
purchase T stock for $200 and then cause T to liquidate. In liquidation, T distributes the assets of
D1 to S1 and the assets of D2 to S2. No § 338 election is made. P then sells the stock of S2 to an
unrelated party and determines its gain with reference to its $100 basis in S2 stock.
This structure works only if it comes within I.R.C. § 337(a) (Supp. IV 1986), an exception to
General Utilities repeal. Section 337(a) provides for no gain or loss to be recognized to the corpora-
tion on a distribution to an 80% distributee in a complete liquidation to which § 332 applies. Quali-
fication depended on the applicability of Reg. § 1.1502-34 (as amended in 1966) to aggregate the
holdings of S1 and S2 for purposes of satisfying the 80% distributee requirement. The 1987 Act
prevents mirror transactions from qualifying for tax-free treatment by requiring the corporate dis-
tributee to own directly 80% of the stock of the liquidating corporation. See supra note 104.
160. These techniques include: (i) the tiered-mirror technique; (ii) the investment basis adjust-
ment technique; (iii) the § 304-consolidated return technique; (iv) the § 355 technique; and (v) the
subsidiary tracking stock technique. For a description of these techniques and the effect of the
proposed 1987 Act changes on their continued viability see Zolt, supra note 92, at 824-32.
161. See supra note 104.
162. Accounting strategies for deferral have been greatly affected by several specific changes in
the 1986 Act. See supra note 78.
163. The reorganization provisions may take on even greater importance if the Senate Finance
Committee's 1985 proposals are adopted. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONrI.,
IsT SEss., FINAL REPORT ON SUBCHAPTER C, THE SUBCHAPTER C REvISION ACT OF 1985
(Comm. Print 1985). These proposals for changing the tax regime for mergers and acquisitions can
be traced back to the AMERICAN LAW INsTrrrTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER
C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (1982), and the STAFF OF SEN-
ATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., IsT SEss., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983). For a discussion of an earlier draft of
these proposals, see Beghe, The American Law Institute Subchapter C Study: Acquisitions and Distri-
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gain rate preference increases the tax cost to a selling shareholder from a maxi-
mum of 20% before the 1986 Act to a maximum of 28% (or 33% within the 5%
surcharge range). Second, the value of deductions available to the purchaser
that are generated by a stepped-up basis decreases. The tax benefit decreases
because of lower corporate tax rates and new rules restricting some of the previ-
ous flexibility on purchase price allocations."6 Finally, the repeal of the Gen-
eral Utilities doctrine requires payment of a corporate-level tax on the
appreciation in corporate assets either upon a liquidation or a sale by the selling
corporation, or when a section 338 election is made by the acquiring corporation
to obtain a stepped-up basis in the acquired corporation's assets.165
The 1986 Act changes eliminate the attractiveness of the retained earnings
strategy. Although the strategy still defers the shareholder-level tax, it no longer
allows shareholders to bail out earnings at capital gain rates. In the post-1986
Act tax regime, assuming both shareholders and corporations are at the maxi-
mum marginal tax rate, a 6% penalty exists for retaining funds in corporate
form. 166
Exceptions to the nondesirability of the retained earnings strategy, how-
butions, 33 TAX LAW. 743 (1980). They would repeal the current statutory requirements for the
different types of acquisitive reorganizations and eliminate the judicial requirements of continuity of
interest, continuity of business enterprise, and business purpose. Qualifying transactions would have
the following tax consequences: the target shareholders receive nonrecognition treatment to the
extent they exchange their target stock for stock of the acquiring corporation or an affiliate, or
exchange securities for an equal principal amount of securities of any member of the acquiring
group, and the target has nonrecognition treatment. The acquiring corporation takes a carryover
basis in the target's assets. These proposals allow the parties the option of treating the transaction as
taxable or tax-free without regard to the corporate form of the transaction as either a stock or asset
sale, and eliminate the old byzantine structure that previously governed acquisitions.
Alternatively, a cost basis election can be made by the acquiring corporation to treat the trans-
action as a taxable acquisition. In such case, the target recognizes gain or loss with respect to its
assets and the acquiring corporation takes a cost basis in the assets acquired. For a summary of the
debate over the proposed revisions to the acquisition rules, see LeDuc, Current Proposals to Restruc-
ture the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions: Substance and Process, 22 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 17, 54-62 (1985).
164. I.R.C. § 1060 requires that both the target and acquiring corporation allocate purchase
price in asset acquisitions under the residual method prescribed in the § 338 regulations. I.R.C.
§ 1060 (Supp. IV 1986). The regulations require that the purchase price be allocated first to cash
and cash equivalents, then to marketable securities, certificates of deposits, government securities,
and foreign currency to the extent of their fair market value, then to all other assets except goodwill
to the extent of their fair market value, and that any remaining amount be allocated to goodwill.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (1986). Second-tier allocations under the proportionate method
are not allowed.
165. The 1986 Act amended § 338 to treat the "deemed" sale of assets as a taxable transaction in
which all gain, not just recapture liability, is recognized in order to obtain a stepped-up basis of the
acquired assets. See I.R.C. § 338 (West Supp. 1988). Transactions structured to achieve a stepped-
up basis make sense only in such limited circumstances as the following: (i) the selling corporation
qualifies for the small corporation exception to the General Utilities repeal; (ii) the selling corpora-
tion has sufficient net operating losses to absorb the gain; or (iii) the gain to the selling parent corpo-
ration of a subsidiary stock approximates the gain on sale of subsidiary assets.
166. With the present structure, the Code provisions aimed at combating the retained earnings
strategy may now be even more superfluous than before. See Kwall, Subchapter G of the Internal
Revenue Code: Crusade Without a Cause?, 5 VA. TAX REv. 223 (1985). The corporation could still,
however, be used as an investment vehicle to purchase stock in unrelated corporations in lieu of
distributing funds to shareholders. See A.L.I., REPORTER'S STUDY, supra note 36, at 487-513. This
may support tying repeal of the accumulated earnings and personal holding company tax provisions
to repeal of the dividends received deduction for corporations making portfolio investments.
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ever, exist for nontax and tax reasons. First, the retained earnings strategy is
preferred when investment opportunities are better at the corporate level than at
the shareholder level. Second, it is preferred when the tax costs to the share-
holder and the corporation of distributing assets outweigh the tax benefit of
holding assets in noncorporate form. Finally, a retained earnings strategy is
beneficial when one believes that tax law may change again to restore the capital
gain rate preference, or to set the maximum individual tax rate above the maxi-
mum corporate rate.
Increased use of share repurchase plans evidence a new approach to the
retained earnings strategy. These plans, under which publicly held corporations
buy back a part of their stock, achieve the exact economic effects of a dividend
without any adverse tax consequences to remaining shareholders. Two objec-
tives are achieved. First, remaining shareholders can defer recognizing gain un-
til they dispose of their shares or can take advantage of the stepped-up basis
provisions of section 1014. Second, excess funds are distributed by corporations
and are therefore not subject to the higher corporate tax rates. 167
3. Bailout Techniques
The 1986 Act changes completely revise taxpayer strategies for bailout
techniques. Ending the capital gain rate preference eliminates most of the at-
tractiveness of structuring transactions to achieve capital gain treatment. 168
Structuring transactions to achieve capital gain treatment, however, still has
some advantages. First, a transaction qualifying for capital gain treatment al-
lows taxpayers to recover their basis before recognizing any gain. Second, the
character of gains and losses as either capital or noncapital remains important in
the netting process to determine whether a taxpayer has a net capital gain or
loss. Although the 1986 Act eliminates the rate preference, it retains the restric-
tions on using capital losses to offset ordinary income. Therefore a taxpayer
with substantial capital losses will still have great incentive to structure transac-
tiofis to achieve capital gain treatment.
169
4. Summary
The 1986 and 1987 Acts strongly affect taxpayer strategies. Closely held
167. There may also be no adverse tax consequences to a selling shareholder if the shareholder
was planning to dispose of her shares anyway or if the shareholder is tax-exempt. For a discussion of
the economic effects of share repurchase plans and a proposal to tax remaining shareholders as if
they received a dividend, see Chirelstein, Optional Redemptions and Optional Dividends: Taxing the
Repurchase of Common Shares, 78 YALE L.J. 739 (1969).
168. See generally Faber, Capital Gains v. Dividends in Corporate Transactions" Is the Battle Still
Worth Fighting?, 64 TAXES 865 (1986) (examining several different types of capital gain transactions
and concluding that the elimination of the capital gain rate preference significantly reduces but does
not eliminate incentives for capital gain treatment).
169. A bailout strategy may be directed at borrowing against appreciated property. By borrow-
ing against assets or stock, a taxpayer can unlock appreciation in the property without causing any
gain to be recognized.
Another bailout strategy that acquires even greater appeal after the 1986 Act is the use of I.R.C.
§ 1014 (1982) to pass property to heirs without a tax on predeath appreciation. Eliminating the
capital gain rate preference increases the lock-in effect for elderly taxpayers.
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entities generally can still choose between having their income subject to a cor-
porate-level tax or having the income taxed directly to the owners. Following
the 1986 Act, the decision to avoid subjecting income to the corporate-level tax
becomes easier. Taxpayer strategies before the 1986 Act sought to lessen the
biases caused by a separate corporate tax system. These strategies relied heavily
on the availability of the capital gain rate preference, corporate tax rates that
were lower than individual rates, and the General Utilities doctrine.
The 1986 Act has curtailed these strategies. Several post-1986 Act strate-
gies have emerged for closely held entities. Taxpayers will increasingly operate
in noncorporate form or elect S corporation status. Closely held entities subject
to the corporate tax will make increased efforts to shift income away from the
corporation to individuals or partnerships through the use of such arrangements
as additional compensation to shareholder-employees, additional debt in the
capital structure, and leasing of property by shareholders to the corporation.
Taxpayers will expend great effort to qualify under nonrecognition provisions
for tax deferral at either the shareholder or corporate level. Publicly held enti-
ties have fewer alternatives. Their ability to operate in noncorporate form is
severely restricted by the 1987 Act. Several preferences that reduced corporate
tax liability have been eliminated or reduced by the 1986 or 1987 Acts, such as
investment tax credits and favorable accounting provisions.
The elimination of the potential tax benefits of operating in the corporate
form for closely held entities, combined with changes restricting the ability of
publicly held entities to reduce corporate-level tax liabilities, will have a dual
effect. More closely held entities will elect against C corporation status, and
publicly held corporations will be subject to a higher effective tax rate. The
corporate tax thus will be borne, in even greater proportion than before, by pub-
licly held rather than closely held entities.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM PROPOSALS
Before the 1986 Act, the corporate tax system, while not perfectly balanced,
was in rough equilibrium. Although there were plenty of tax-induced distor-
tions, enough compensating biases existed that, generally, tax considerations in-
fluenced but did not dictate taxpayer decisions on form of investment, financing,
and dividend policy. Although past tax law changes have affected the compen-
sating biases in the tax system,170 nothing compares to the disequilibrating ef-
fects of the 1986 Act changes. Blinded by the desire to substantially reduce
individual tax rates and to maintain revenue neutrality, Congress destroyed the
170. See generally Taylor, Tax Policy and Changes to Subchapter C, 48 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 57 (Autumn 1985) (reviewing changes to Subchapter C effected by previous tax law
changes). For example, past tax acts have affected the balance in the individual and corporate tax
systems by changing the relative individual and corporate tax rates, by changing the preference
accorded capital gains, by reducing corporate tax liabilities through larger depreciation deductions
and credits, by relaxing the qualification requirements and simplifying the tax treatment of S corpo-
rations, and by changing the ability of a corporation to transfer appreciated property without recog-
nizing a corporate-level gain.
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compensating biases in the tax system. The 1987 Act further exacerbated the
situation.
The 1986 and 1987 Acts are likely to influence taxpayer behavior in several
ways. These changes will strongly influence taxpayers to operate in
noncorporate form or as an S corporation, to shift income away from the corpo-
ration, to increase the relative amount of debt in the corporation's capital struc-
ture, to increase the amount of dividends paid, and to squeeze transactions to fit
within various nonrecognition provisions. All of these strategies are forms of
self-help integration. Self-help integration results in both costs1 7 1 and bene-
fits 172 to the tax system, and does address some of the problems resulting from
the destruction of the compensating biases in the tax system. Tolerating self-
help integration, however, is hardly a rational approach to the problems created
by the imbalance in the corporate tax system.
Some consequences will certainly follow from self-help integration tech-
niques. There will be increased transaction costs from taxpayers changing the
form of operations and operating in more cumbersome forms. The tax system
will tax in a dissimilar manner taxpayers who are alike in all but the form of
their transactions. The difference in form, however, does not justify different tax
treatment. Some consequences are less certain but quite plausible. There may
occur a reallocation of resources away from the corporate sector. There also
may be increased use of debt and increased payout of corporate earnings as divi-
dends. Because closely held corporations have more opportunities to avoid or
reduce the corporate-level tax, the corporate tax may be borne even more dispro-
portionately than in the past by publicly held rather than closely held corpora-
tions. Finally, there may be a loss of tax revenues from an erosion of the
corporate tax base.
The desirability of these consequences is open to question. Clearly, Con-
gress did not grasp the potential consequences of the 1986 and 1987 Acts on the
taxation of corporations and their shareholders, nor did it intend these results.
Without further legislative action, the trend towards self-help integration will
increase. If Congress finds these consequences undesirable it has three alterna-
tives: it can restore some of the tax incentives to using the corporate form; it can
adopt some proposal for integrating the individual and corporate tax system; or
it can continue to reinforce the two-tier tax system by adopting further measures
to combat self-help integration. Unfortunately, none of the alternatives consti-
171. Tolerating self-help integration techniques damages the tax system, increases transaction
costs and complexity, and reduces tax revenues. See generally Canellos, supra note 145 (examining
self-help integration techniques and arguing for serious consideration of formal integration propos-
als). Leaving the question whether to integrate the tax system to taxpayer initiative is unsound tax
policy. Self-help integration techniques increase transaction costs and complexity as taxpayers
change the form of their operations and operate in a more cumbersome form. The techniques result
in an erosion of the corporate tax base as capital is shifted from corporate form and income is shifted
from corporations to entities taxable only at the individual level.
172. To the extent the two-tier tax system results in inefficiencies and unfairness, self-help inte-
gration techniques may reduce those biases and inequities. The self-help integration approach
achieves some of the benefits of integration without having to face the political battles that integra-
tion proposals would likely engender.
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tutes an easy solution to the problems caused by changes in the 1986 and 1987
Acts.
Congress can restore the tax incentives to use the corporate form by rein-
stating some of the compensating biases. This can be accomplished by reinstat-
ing the capital gain rate preference or by setting the maximum individual tax
rate higher than the maximum corporate tax rate. These two changes would
restore the tax advantage of keeping funds in corporate form and would increase
the desirability of the retained earnings strategy.1 73 Changing the taxation of
capital gains and reversing the relative individual and corporate tax rates, how-
ever, may result in distortions in other parts of the tax system. Perhaps the
simplest approach is to adopt the same maximum marginal rates for individuals
and corporations. The adoption of the same maximum rates at least redresses
the current tax penalty for retaining funds in corporate form.
Another approach focuses on integrating the individual and corporate tax
systems. The tax system after the 1986 Act is more conducive to integration
because the capital gain rate preference has been eliminated and the corporate
tax rate has been raised above the individual rate. Politically, however, the
chances of adopting a meaningful integration proposal are extremely slim. 174
Although theoretically desirable, integration does not offer much hope as a prac-
tical solution to the current imbalance in the corporate tax system.
The final approach is to continue the 1987 Act's tack of curtailing self-help
integration techniques. The 1987 Act limits the ability of and the attractiveness
for publicly owned entities to operate as limited partnerships in order to avoid
the corporate-level tax. The 1987 Act also prevents acquiring corporations from
disposing of newly acquired property without a corporate-level tax. Areas of
possible future legislative action include: limiting the deductibility of interest,
particularly interest incurred in connection with acquisitions or redemptions or
for corporations with excessive debt in their capital structure; limiting schemes
to siphon-off corporate income to related pass-through entities by attributing
income back to the corporation using the property when there is no good eco-
nomic purpose for the arrangement; and repealing section 1014 to eliminate the
shareholder level relief this section affords by allowing predeath appreciation to
escape untaxed. Congress has previously attempted to address these problems
with mixed success. Even assuming greater progress in combatting self-help in-
tegration techniques, ingenious taxpayers will develop new techniques that will
then require congressional attention. The approach of combatting self-help inte-
173. Alternatively, the tax cost of operating in noncorporate form could be increased by subject-
ing income from noncorporate sources to an additional tax or by allowing certain tax incentives only
for entities taxed as corporations.
174. See eg., comments of Robert Leonard, Chief Tax Counsel of House of Representatives
Ways and Means Committee reported in Sheppard, Subchapter C Reform: Live Aid for Elective
Carryover Basis, 35 TAx NOTES 225, 228 (1987) and of Dennis Ross, Tax Legislative Counsel, De-
partment of Treasury, reported in Sheppard, Through the Looking Glass, 35 TAX NoTEs 436, 436
(1987). Integration may be politically unacceptable because of the revenue loss, the public resistance
for reducing or eliminating the corporate tax, the corporate manager's resistance to tax law changes
that encourage distribution of funds to shareholders, and practical problems in designing an integra-
tion system given the large holdings by foreign and tax-exempt shareholders.
[Vol. 66
1988] CORPORATE TAX 877
gration is therefore not a good long-term solution to the imbalance in the corpo-
rate tax system.
In conclusion, the taxation of corporations and their shareholders is in an
unstable state. The condition results from changes in the 1986 and 1987 Acts.
Congress enacted these changes without full consideration of their effect on cor-
porate taxation. The time is ripe for Congress to focus on the taxation of corpo-
rations and their shareholders and to re-establish some balance in the corporate
tax system.

